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The discriminatory effects that may stem from biometric ID 
cybersurveillance and other algorithmically-driven screening technologies 
can be better understood through the analytical prism of “crimmigration-
counterterrorism”: the conflation of crime, immigration, and counterterrorism 
policy. The historical genesis for this phenomenon can be traced back to 
multiple migration law developments, including the Chinese Exclusion Act 
of 1882. To implement stricter immigration controls at the border and 
interior, both the federal and state governments developed immigration 
enforcement schemes that depended upon both biometric identification 
documents and immigration screening protocols. This Article uses 
contemporary attempts to implement an expanded regime of “extreme 
vetting” to better understand modern crimmigration-counterterrorism 
rationales and technologies. Like the implementation of the Chinese 
Exclusion Act, extreme vetting, or enhanced vetting, relies upon biometric 
data as an anchor point for identity databasing and security screening. Thus, 
emerging vetting systems provide a timely example of the conflation of 
crime, immigration, and counterterrorism policy. It concludes that Critical 
Theory and theories of discrimination that stem from litigation surrounding 
crimmigration-counterterrorism policies may suggest legal avenues to guard 
against the risk of cyber-registries and algorithmic screening systems 
dependent upon biometric databases that may promote discriminatory vetting. 
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INTRODUCTION 
This Article examines the potential discriminatory impact of efforts 
to expand biometric ID cybersurveillance1 and algorithmically-driven 
cyber-registration,2 in the context of the Travel Ban,3 “extreme vetting,”4 
 
 1. See, e.g., Margaret Hu, Biometric ID Cybersurveillance, 88 IND. L.J. 1475 
(2013) [hereinafter Hu, Biometric ID]; Margaret Hu, Biometric Cyberintelligence and the 
Posse Comitatus Act, 66 EMORY L.J. 697 (2017) [hereinafter Hu, Biometric 
Cyberintelligence]; KELLY A. GATES, OUR BIOMETRIC FUTURE: FACIAL RECOGNITION 
TECHNOLOGY AND THE CULTURE OF SURVEILLANCE (2011); JENNIFER LYNCH, FROM 
FINGERPRINTS TO DNA: BIOMETRIC DATA COLLECTION IN U.S. IMMIGRANT COMMUNITIES 
AND BEYOND (2012); SHOSHANA AMIELLE MAGNET, WHEN BIOMETRICS FAIL: GENDER, 
RACE, AND THE TECHNOLOGY OF IDENTITY (2011); Christopher W. Clifton, Deirdre K. 
Mulligan & Raghu Ramakrishnan, Data Mining and Privacy: An Overview, in PRIVACY 
AND TECHNOLOGIES OF IDENTITY: A CROSS-DISCIPLINARY CONVERSATION 191, 203 
(Katherine J. Strandburg & Daniela Stan Raicu eds., 2006); Laura K. Donohue, 
Technological Leap, Statutory Gap, and Constitutional Abyss: Remote Biometric 
Identification Comes of Age, 97 MINN. L. REV. 407 (2012). 
 2. See infra notes 173–175, 256–270 and accompanying text, and discussion 
in Part III.B. See also Margaret Hu, Algorithmic Jim Crow, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 633 
(2017). 
 3. See infra notes 22–31 and accompanying text, and discussion in Part II.B. 
Many immigration, constitutional law, and national security scholars have commented on 
the legality and constitutionality of the Travel Ban. See, e.g., Josh Blackman, Hawaii v. 
Trump: What would an “Objective Observer” Think of President Trump’s Travel Ban?, 
LAWFARE INSTITUTE (May 16, 2017, 11:03 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/hawaii-v-
trump-what-would-objective-observer-think-president-trumps-travel-ban 
[https://perma.cc/HB27-6UXL]; Adam Cox, Why a Muslim Ban is Likely to be Held 
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and other contemporary immigration policy developments.5 It suggests 
that Critical Theories6—such as “critical biometric consciousness,”7 
 
Unconstitutional: The Myth of Unconstrained Immigration Power, JUSTSECURITY (Jan. 
30, 2017, 10:21 AM), https://www.justsecurity.org/36988/muslim-ban-held-
unconstitutional-myth-unconstrained-immigration-power/ [https://perma.cc/XJ8P-
JAGM]; Marty Lederman, Unlocking the Mysteries of the Supreme Court’s Entry Ban 
Case, JUSTSECURITY (June 27, 2017, 8:01 PM), 
https://www.justsecurity.org/42577/mysteries-trump-v-irap/ [https://perma.cc/9JBY-
2YA7?type=image]; Leah Litman & Steve Vladeck, How the President’s “Clarifying” 
Memorandum Destroys the Case for the Entry Ban, JUST SECURITY (June 15, 2017, 8:01 
AM), https://www.justsecurity.org/42166/presidents-clarifying-memorandum-destroys-
case-entry-ban/ [https://perma.cc/R7L3-E4VX]; Peter Margulies, The Travel Ban in the 
Supreme Court: Crafting a Workable Remedy, LAWFARE INSTITUTE (June 26, 2017, 3:24 
PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/travel-ban-supreme-court-crafting-workable-remedy 
[https://perma.cc/EED6-UT2S]; IIya Somin, Trump’s Revised Travel Ban is Still Cruel 
and Still Unconstitutional, WASH. POST: THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Mar. 6, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2017/03/06/trumps-
revised-travel-ban-is-still-cruel-and-still-unconstitutional/?utm_term=.5ae82e025123 
[https://perma.cc/E53G-XCDN]; Mark Tushnet, Mootness and the Travel Ban, BALKIN 
BLOGSPOT (June 2, 2017, 1:18 AM), https://balkin.blogspot.com/2017/06/mootness-and-
travel-ban.html [https://perma.cc/8YPX-S2UM]; Benjamin Wittes, Malevolence 
Tempered by Incompetence: Trump’s Horrifying Executive Order on Refugees and Visas, 
LAWFARE INSTITUTE (Jan. 28, 2017, 10:58 PM), https://lawfareblog.com/malevolence-
tempered-incompetence-trumps-horrifying-executive-order-refugees-and-visas 
[https://perma.cc/VKU6-XEQK]. 
 4. See, e.g., Enhancing Vetting Capabilities and Processes for Detecting 
Attempted Entry into United States by Terrorists or Other Public-Safety Threats, 
Proclamation No. 9645, 82 Fed. Reg. 45161 (Sept. 24, 2017) [hereinafter Proclamation, 
Sept. 24, Travel Ban III]; Resuming the United States Refugee Admissions Program with 
Enhanced Vetting Capabilities, Exec. Order No. 13,815, 82 Fed. Reg. 50,055 (Oct. 27, 
2017) (stating that enhanced vetting procedures “will enhance the ability of our systems 
to check biometric and biographic information against a broad range of threat information 
contained in various Federal watchlists and databases”) [hereinafter Exec. Order, Oct. 27, 
Enhanced Vetting]. See also infra discussion in Part I.B, notes 145–148, and Part II.C. 
 5. See, e.g., Margaret Hu, Big Data Blacklisting, 67 FLA. L. REV. 1735 (2015) 
[hereinafter Hu, Big Data Blacklisting]; Anil Kalhan, Immigration Surveillance, 74 MD. 
L. REV. 1 (2014); Mark Noferi & Robert Koulish, The Immigration Detention Risk 
Assessment, 29 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 45 (2014) (discussing DHS deployment of automated 
risk assessment algorithms to analyze noncitizen data to assess detention and release 
risks). See also infra notes 253–259 and accompanying text. 
 6. See, e.g., CRITICAL THEORY & SOCIETY: A READER (Stephen Eric Bronner & 
Douglas MacKay Kellner eds., 1989); DAVID COUZENS HOY & THOMAS MCCARTHY, 
CRITICAL THEORY (1994); THOMAS MCCARTHY, IDEALS & ILLUSIONS: ON 
RECONSTRUCTION & DECONSTRUCTION IN CONTEMPORARY CRITICAL THEORY (1993); 
THOMAS MCCARTHY, THE CRITICAL THEORY OF JÜRGEN HABERMAS (1989); THE 
ESSENTIAL FRANKFURT READER 205 (Andrew Arato & Eike Gebhardt eds., 1985). 
 7. SIMONE BROWNE, DARK MATTERS: ON THE SURVEILLANCE OF BLACKNESS 
116 (2015). See also Trina Jones, Shades of Brown: The Law of Skin Color, 49 DUKE L.J. 
1487 (2000). 
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Critical Race Theory,8 Surveillance Studies,9 Critical Terrorism 
Studies,10 and other theories—are necessary to examine the increasing 
racialization and subordinating effects of biometric ID cybersurveillance 
and other technologies that may facilitate cyber-registration under 
national security justifications. Specifically, the Article contends that the 
expansion of biometric ID cybersurveillance and national security vetting 
is supported by crimmigration11-counterterrorism12: a conflation of 
crime, immigration, and counterterrorism policy.13 
 
 8. See, e.g., DERRICK BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM OF THE WELL: THE 
PERMANENCE OF RACISM 144–45 (1993); DOROTHY BROWN, CRITICAL RACE THEORY: 
CASES, MATERIALS, AND PROBLEMS (2014); DEVON W. CARBADO & MITU GULATI, 
ACTING WHITE?: RETHINKING RACE IN POST-RACIAL AMERICA (2013); JESSIE DANIELS, 
CYBER RACISM: WHITE SUPREMACY ONLINE AND THE NEW ATTACK ON CIVIL RIGHTS 
(2009); RICHARD DELGADO & JEAN STEFANCIC, CRITICAL RACE THEORY: AN 
INTRODUCTION (2012); LANI GUINIER, LIFT EVERY VOICE: TURNING A CIVIL RIGHTS 
SETBACK INTO NEW VISION OF SOCIAL JUSTICE (1998); THE NEW BLACK: WHAT HAS 
CHANGED—AND WHAT HAS NOT—WITH RACE IN AMERICA (KENNETH W. MACK & 
GUY-URIEL E. CHARLES EDS.) (2013); PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND 
RIGHTS: DIARY OF A LAW PROFESSOR (1992); Devon W. Carbado, Critical What What?, 
43 CONN. L. REV. 1593 (2011); Derrick Bell, Racial Realism, 24 CONN. L. REV. 363 
(1992); Guy-Uriel E. Charles, Colored Speech: Cross Burnings, Epistemics, and the 
Triumph of the Crits?, 93 GEO. L.J. 575 (2005); Kimberlé Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and 
Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. 
L. REV. 1331 (1988); Neil Gotanda, A Critique of “Our Constitution is Color-Blind,” 44 
STAN. L. REV. 1 (1991); Jerry Kang, Trojan Horses of Race, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1489 
(2005). 
 9. See generally JOHN GILLIOM & TORIN MONAHAN, SUPERVISION: AN 
INTRODUCTION TO THE SURVEILLANCE SOCIETY (2013); DAVID LYON, SURVEILLANCE 
SOCIETY: MONITORING EVERYDAY LIFE (2001); DAVID LYON, SURVEILLANCE STUDIES: AN 
OVERVIEW 16 (2007); Julie E. Cohen, Studying Law Studying Surveillance, 13 
SURVEILLANCE & SOC’Y 91, 91 (2015), 
https://ojs.library.queensu.ca/index.php/surveillance-and-society/article/view/law/5368 
[https://perma.cc/AY56-CPRN]; Oscar H. Gandy, Jr., Surveillance and the Formation of 
Public Policy, 15 SURVEILLANCE & SOC’Y 158 (2017); Kevin D. Haggerty & Richard V. 
Ericson, The Surveillant Assemblage, 51 BRIT. J. SOC. 605 (2000); Sean P. Hier, Probing 
the Surveillant Assemblage: On the Dialectics of Surveillance Practices as Processes of 
Social Control, 1 SURVEILLANCE & SOC’Y 399 (2003); David Lyon, Surveillance, 
Snowden, and Big Data: Capacities, Consequences, Critique, BIG DATA & SOC’Y, July-
Dec. 2014, at 1 http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/2053951714541861 
[https://perma.cc/4X4F-ZMY8]. 
 10. See, e.g., CRITICAL TERRORISM STUDIES: A NEW RESEARCH AGENDA 19, 140 
(Richard Jackson, Marie Breen Smyth & Jeroen Gunning eds., 2009); Amna Akbar, 
Policing “Radicalization”, 3 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 809, 845–51 (2013); James Forman, Jr., 
Exporting Harshness: How the War on Crime Helped Make the War on Terror Possible, 
33 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 331, 332–41 (2009); Jeroen Gunning, A Case for 
Critical Terrorism Studies?, 42 GOV’T & OPPOSITION 363, 363–96 (2007). 
 11. The term “crimmigration” was coined by Juliet Stumpf. Juliet Stumpf, The 
Crimmigration Crisis: Immigrants, Crime, and Sovereign Power, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 367 
(2006). A growing body of literature examines the increasing merger of criminal law and 
immigration law and policy. See, e.g., SOCIAL CONTROL AND JUSTICE: CRIMMIGRATION IN 
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The historical genesis for this phenomenon can be traced back to 
multiple migration law developments, including the Chinese Exclusion 
Act of 1882.14 The Chinese Exclusion Act facilitated stricter immigration 
controls at the border and interior.15 These identification and vetting 
systems were extended as part of the Japanese-American internment 
effort during World War II and have become increasingly 
technologically advanced in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of 
September 11th, 2001.16 
Anti-immigrant rhetoric, or the view that immigrants are inherently 
suspicious and dangerous, is not a new phenomenon.17 The United 
States, despite being comprised of immigrants, has a history of treating 
individuals as suspect based on their nationality, ethnicity, and 
immigration status: Chinese immigrants;18 Irish and other European 
 
THE AGE OF FEAR 8–9 (Maria João Guia et al. eds., 2013); Jennifer M. Chacón, Managing 
Migration Through Crime, 109 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 135, 137–38 (2009); Ingrid V. 
Eagly, Criminal Justice for Noncitizens: An Analysis of Variation in Local Enforcement, 
88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1126, 1139–41 (2013); César Cuauhtémoc García 
Hernández, Creating Crimmigration, 2013 BYU L. REV. 1457, 1467–68 [hereinafter 
Hernández, Creating Crimigration]; César Cuauhtémoc García Hernández, Naturalizing 
Immigration Imprisonment, 103 CALIF. L. REV. 1449, 1492–94 (2015); Yolanda 
Vazquez, Advising Noncitizen Defendants on the Immigration Consequences of Criminal 
Convictions: The Ethical Answer for the Criminal Defense Lawyer, the Court, and the 
Sixth Amendment, 20 BERKELEY LA RAZA L.J. 31, 43 (2010). 
 12. See, e.g., PHILIP BOBBITT, TERROR AND CONSENT: THE WARS FOR THE 
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 138–41 (2009); MARY L. DUDZIAK, WAR TIME: AN IDEA, ITS 
HISTORY, ITS CONSEQUENCES 135–36 (2012); ERIK LUNA & WAYNE MCCORMACK, 
UNDERSTANDING THE LAW OF TERRORISM 141–44 (2d. ed. 2015). 
 13. See Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, Is Immigration Law National Security 
Law?, 66 EMORY L.J. 669, 676–77, 685–87 (2017); Hu, Biometric ID, supra note 1, at 
1483–84; Hu, Big Data Blacklisting, supra note 5, at 1786; Biometric Cyberintelligence, 
supra note 1, at 701. See generally DAVID COLE, ENEMY ALIENS: DOUBLE STANDARDS 
AND CONSTITUTIONAL FREEDOMS IN THE WAR ON TERRORISM 26–27, 34–35 (2003); 
LEGAL BORDERLANDS: LAW AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF AMERICAN BORDERS 386 (Mary 
L. Dudziak & Leti Volpp eds., 2006); GERALD L. NEUMAN, STRANGERS TO THE 
CONSTITUTION: IMMIGRANTS, BORDERS, AND FUNDAMENTAL LAW (1996). 
 14. Chinese Exclusion Act, ch. 126, 22 Stat. 58 (1882) (repealed 1943). 
 15. See Hernández, Creating Crimmigration, supra note 11, at 1486–87. 
 16. See, e.g., KEVIN R. JOHNSON, THE “HUDDLED MASSES MYTH”: IMMIGRATION 
AND CIVIL RIGHTS 15, 20–21 (2004). See also Cole, supra note 13. 
 17. See, e.g., BILL ONG HING, DEFINING AMERICA THROUGH IMMIGRATION 
POLICY (2003); Gabriel J. Chin, Segregation’s Last Stronghold: Race Discrimination and 
the Constitutional Law of Immigration, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1 (1998); JOHNSON, supra note 
16. See generally Linda Bosniak, Member, Equality, and the Difference that Alienage 
Makes, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 104 (1994); Jennifer M. Chacón, Essay: Immigration and the 
Bully Pulpit, 130 HARV. L. REV. FORUM 7 (2017); Karla M. McKanders, Federal 
Preemption and Immigrants’ Rights, 3 WAKE FOREST J.L. & POL’Y 333 (2013). See also 
supra note 11.  
 18. See, e.g., H. Res. 683, 112th Cong. (Expressing that “the House of 
Representatives regrets the passage of legislation that adversely affected people of 
  
960 WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW 
immigrants;19 U.S. citizens of Japanese descent;20 Latino immigrants;21 
and, with the recent Executive Orders,22 immigrants, refugees, and 
travelers from countries with a Muslim-majority population.23 
Recent technological developments permit increasing 
cybersurveillance of populations, particularly the immigrant 
demographic and related proxies. The expansion of biometric ID 
cybersurveillance, a subset of broader trends in cybersurveillance and 
 
Chinese origin in the United States because of their ethnicity,” including the Chinese 
Exclusion Act”); IRIS CHANG, THE CHINESE IN AMERICA 130 (2003); ERIKA LEE, AT 
AMERICA’S GATES: CHINESE IMMIGRATION DURING THE EXCLUSION ERA, 1882–1943 16–
17 (2005); JEAN PFAELZER, DRIVEN OUT: THE FORGOTTEN WAR AGAINST CHINESE 
AMERICANS 253 (2008); FRANK WU, YELLOW: RACE IN AMERICA: BEYOND BLACK AND 
WHITE (2002); Mark Kanazawa, Immigration, Exclusion, and Taxation: Anti-Chinese 
Legislation in Gold Rush California, 65 J. ECON. HIST. 779, 779–83 (2005). 
 19. See, e.g., National Origin Act, Pub. L. No. 68–139, Stat (1924); MAE M. 
NGAI, IMPOSSIBLE SUBJECTS: ILLEGAL ALIENS AND THE MAKING OF MODERN AMERICA 17–
21 (2004). See also MADISON GRANT, THE CONQUEST OF A CONTINENT 160 (1933); NOEL 
IGNATIEV, HOW THE IRISH BECAME WHITE 40–41(1995); THE ALIEN IN OUR MIDST 
(Madison Grant & Chas. Stewart Davison eds., 1930). 
 20. See, e.g., ERIC K. YAMAMOTO, ET. AL, RACE, RIGHTS, AND REPARATION: 
LAW AND THE JAPANESE AMERICAN INTERNMENT 34–35, 181 (2nd ed. 2013); ERIC L. 
MULLER, AMERICAN INQUISITION: THE HUNT FOR JAPANESE AMERICAN DISLOYALTY IN 
WWII (2007); MARY MATSUDA GRUENEWALD, LOOKING LIKE THE ENEMY: MY STORY OF 
IMPRISONMENT IN JAPANESE-AMERICAN INTERNMENT CAMPS 3, 8–9 (2005); ONLY WHAT 
WE COULD CARRY: THE JAPANESE AMERICAN INTERNMENT EXPERIENCE (Lawson Fusao 
Inada ed., 2000); RICHARD REEVES, INFAMY: THE SHOCKING STORY OF THE JAPANESE 
AMERICAN INTERNMENT IN WORLD WAR II 98–100 (2015). 
 21. See, e.g., HIROSHI MOTOMURA, IMMIGRATION OUTSIDE THE LAW (2014); 
HIROSHI MOTOMURA, AMERICANS IN WAITING: THE LOST STORY OF IMMIGRATION AND 
CITIZENSHIP IN THE UNITED STATES (2006); VICTOR C. ROMERO, ALIENATED: IMMIGRANT 
RIGHTS, THE CONSTITUTION, AND EQUALITY IN AMERICA (2004). 
 22. President Trump issued a pair of Executive Orders with the same title: 
Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry into the United States. The first was 
issued on January 27, 2017. See Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry into 
the United States, Exec. Order No. 13,769, 82 Fed. Reg. 8977 (Jan. 27, 2017) [hereinafter 
Exec. Order, Jan. 27, Travel Ban I]. It was challenged in the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Washington, and a temporary restraining order was granted. 
See Washington v. Trump, 847 F.3d 1151, 1157–58 (9th Cir. 2017) (per curiam). The 
government sought an emergency stay, which the Ninth Circuit denied. Id. at 1169. 
Subsequently, the President issued a second Executive Order on March 6, 2017, with the 
same title, but certain modifications. See Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist 
Entry into the United States, Exec. Order No. 13,780, 82 Fed. Reg. 13209 (Mar. 6, 2017) 
[hereinafter Exec. Order, Mar. 6, Travel Ban II]. The Ninth Circuit granted the 
government’s unopposed motion to dismiss its appeal of the stay on the first Executive 
Order. See Hawaii v. Trump, 859 F.3d 741, 757 (9th Cir. 2017) (per curiam).  
 23. The first Executive Order barred nationals of Iraq, Iran, Libya, Somalia, 
Sudan, Syria, and Yemen from entering the United States for ninety days, both as 
immigrants and non-immigrants. See Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 857 F.3d 
554, 572 (4th Cir. 2017). The second Executive Order eliminated Iraq as one of the 
designated countries. Id. at 573. These countries have predominately Muslim populations. 
See id. at 572 n.2.  
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dataveillance (data surveillance within the umbrella of 
cybersurveillance), is supported by crimmigration-counterterrorism.24 
Both the federal and state governments have developed immigration 
enforcement schemes that depend upon biometric identification 
documents and immigration screening protocols.25 Immigration controls 
under the Chinese Exclusion Act employed one of the earliest methods 
of bureaucratized biometric identification—the Bertillon System.26 
The Travel Ban litigation offers an opportunity to examine why 
discrimination by way of extreme vetting is difficult to conceptualize 
under traditional legal frameworks when the discriminatory effect occurs 
in a facially neutral way and is also technologically assisted.27 To date, 
the Travel Ban litigation has been most developed in a pair of cases: 
International Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump28 and Hawaii v. 
Trump.29 These cases addressed President Trump’s Order titled, 
Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry Into the United 
States,30 which prohibited travel to the United States by nationals of six 
Muslim-majority designated countries, capped refugee admissions, and 
identified a review period to implement what has been described as 
“extreme vetting.”31 
 
 24. Hu, Biometric ID, supra note 1; see also infra notes 259–264 and note 304. 
 25. Chinese Exclusion Act, ch. 126, 22 Stat. 58 (1882) (repealed 1943). 
 26. Kitty Calavita, The Paradoxes of Race, Class, Identity, and “Passing”: 
Enforcing the Chinese Exclusion Acts, 1882–1910, 25 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 1, 22 (2000) 
(“[O]fficers at ports of entry were told not only to photograph all entering and departing 
Chinese laborers, but to conduct a complete ‘physical examination of his person required 
by the Bertillon system of identifications’”).  
 27. See, e.g., Hu, Algorithmic Jim Crow. On June 26, 2017, the Supreme Court 
granted certiorari in the Travel Ban cases, consolidating an appeal of both International 
Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump from the Fourth Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals and 
Hawaii v. See Trump v. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project, 137 S. Ct. 2080, 2085–86 
(2017) (per curiam). However, on September 25, 2017, the Court removed both cases 
from the oral argument calendar. See Trump v. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project, No. 16–
1436, 2017 WL 2405595 (Sept. 25, 2017); Trump v. Hawaii, No. 16–1540, 2017 WL 
2734554 (Sept. 25, 2017). Then, on October 10, 2017, and October 24, 2017, the Court 
vacated the judgments and remanded with instructions to dismiss as moot. Trump v. 
International Refugee Assistance Project and Hawaii v. Trump, respectively. See Trump 
v. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project, No. 16–1436, 2017 WL 4518553 (Oct. 10, 2017); 
Trump v. Hawaii, No. 16–1540, 2017 WL 4782860 (Oct. 24, 2017). 
 28. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 857 F.3d 554 (4th Cir. 2017) (en 
banc), cert. granted 137 S. Ct. 2080 (2017), vacating as moot 2017 WL 4518553.  
 29. Hawaii v. Trump, 859 F.3d 741 (9th Cir. 2017) (per curiam), cert. granted 
137 S. Ct. 2080 (2017), vacating as moot 2017 WL 4782860.  
 30. Exec. Order, Mar. 6, Travel Ban II. 
 31. Id. at 13209–12. See also Peter Margulies, Bans, Borders, and Justice: 
Judicial Review of Immigration Law in the Trump Administration, 35–48 (Roger 
Williams Univ. Sch. of Law, Working Paper No. 177, 2017), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=3029655 [https://perma.cc/VDQ4-PUN6] (arguing for a more 
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Various incarnations of the Travel Ban, and the associated legal 
challenges, currently focus the public’s attention on the entry ban aspects 
of the Executive Orders. Yet, the more significant impact of the 
Executive Orders is the implementation of a cybersurveillance policy 
through enhanced vetting. Extreme or enhanced vetting is a screening 
process that entails using forms of cybersurveillance to collect, store and 
analyze information concerning not only immigrants, but potentially all 
U.S. citizens. And for those who secure entrance, cybersurveillance 
technologies will play a role in their tracking and supervision, such as the 
creation of cyber-registration systems or cyber-registries.  
Just as the Trump administration’s Executive Orders rest upon legal 
precedent mired in controversial historical moments, so the attempt to 
register and track foreign persons in this country has itself an unfortunate 
genealogy. In both cases, understanding the past is crucial to 
contextualizing the present. In order to better understand the surveillance 
implications of “extreme vetting” and potential cyber-registration, Part I 
begins with a review of prior efforts in that regard, with a large focus on 
the Chinese Exclusion Acts of the nineteenth century as the framework 
for understanding current ambitions. Part II summarizes the Trump 
administration’s current efforts in immigration policy to restrict entry 
from several Muslim-majority countries. These executive actions are 
referred to as the “Muslim Ban” or the “Travel Ban.” Part II explains that 
the Travel Ban’s proposal for “extreme vetting” adopts expansion of 
vetting and screening protocols that are dependent upon biometric 
identification systems. It suggests how these vetting and screening 
systems are likely to serve as proxies for race and other classifications 
that can facilitate cybersurveillance and dataveillance.  
In Part III, the Article utilizes Critical Theory to better evaluate how 
crimmigration-counterterrorism policy, when combined with biometric 
ID cybersurveillance technologies and databasing, can lead to a 
phenomenon of cyber-registration. Without the tools of Critical Theory, 
it will be difficult to examine the racialization and discriminatory impact 
of crimmigration-counterterrorism. This is especially the case where the 
technological tools of cyber-registration may appear to be race-neutral 
and where the crimmigration-counterterrorism policy, such as the Travel 
Ban, purports to be facially neutral under the law. The Article concludes 
that Critical Theory, combined with collateral discrimination theories 
that have arisen from the litigation surrounding the Travel Ban, may 
suggest legal avenues to guard against cyber-registries and algorithmic-
driven screening methods that may promote discrimination. 
 
searching judicial review of "extreme vetting” and the need to recognize the significant 
long-term impact of “extreme vetting”). 
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I. UNDERSTANDING THE FUTURE OF CRIMMIGRATION-
COUNTERTERRORISM POLICY THROUGH THE TRAJECTORY OF 
IMMIGRATION LAW AND BIOMETRIC ID CYBERSURVEILLANCE 
Technology and immigration policy began to intersect with the 
introduction of biometric-based technologies and data computing. In the 
1870s and 1880s, advances in mass photography, fingerprinting 
methodologies, and data cataloguing began to emerge. Additionally, 
database-sorting technology was introduced through the invention of the 
Hollerith data-sorting machine in the 1880s.32 The Hollerith machine was 
eventually acquired by IBM, which led to the development of the 
computer.33 The Hollerith machine revolutionized the federal 
government’s ability to count, track, and follow its population for metric 
purposes. However, there remained the question of how to appropriately 
implement internal and external migration control, particularly tracking 
of the Chinese who could lawfully remain in the United States after 
Chinese Exclusion became national policy. 
In 1882, Congress passed “An Act to Execute Certain Treaty 
Stipulations Relating to Chinese,”34 commonly referred to as “The 
Chinese Exclusion Act.” This Act arose as part of an anti-Chinese 
movement that commenced in California and other western states.35 It 
barred the entry of Chinese laborers into the United States for ten years 
and prohibited Chinese laborers who had entered after the Act’s passage 
from remaining.36 The Act specifically defined Chinese laborers as “both 
skilled and unskilled laborers and Chinese employed in mining.”37 The 
rationale for the Act included national security objectives, in that 
Congress reasoned that “the coming of Chinese laborers to this country 
endangers the good order of certain localities within the territory 
thereof[.]”38 
After passage of the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, in order to 
implement stricter immigration controls at the border, the federal 
government developed more elaborate immigration enforcement schemes 
 
 32. SIMON GARFINKEL, DATABASE NATION: THE DEATH OF PRIVACY IN THE 21ST 
CENTURY 17–18 (Deborah Russell ed., 2000).  
 33. Id. at 18. 
 34. Chinese Exclusion Act, 22 Stat. 58 (1882) (repealed 1943).  
 35. See Calavita, supra note 26, at 4. 
 36. Chinese Exclusion Act § 1. (“[U]ntil the expiration of ten years next after 
the passage of this act, the coming of Chinese laborers to the United States be 
. . . suspended; and during such suspension it shall not be lawful for any Chinese laborer 
to come, or having so come . . . to remain within the United States.”); see also Calavita, 
supra note 26, at 1–2.  
 37. Chinese Exclusion Act § 15. 
 38. Id. at pmbl. 
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that depended upon identification documents. Thus, the federal 
government began relying more on identification and travel documents, 
such as visas and passports, to control who could be lawfully admitted in 
the United States. The federal government also developed a system of 
“gatekeepers”: those tasked with distributing documents and inspecting 
documents to keep unwanted migrants out. One scholar refers to this as 
an “unprecedented system” of federal immigration policy through 
“remote control.”39 
In 1885, biometric technology was combined with the concept of 
immigration registration when it was recommended that all Chinese 
immigrants in San Francisco could be registered by the city through 
fingerprinting and biographic data cataloguing.40 Soon thereafter, 
Congress adopted a national policy of identification documentation 
incorporating biometric technology through passage of the Geary Act of 
1892.41 The Geary Act extended the Chinese Exclusion Act, due to 
expire in 1882, by another ten years.42 The Geary Act, along with an 
amendment titled the McCreary Amendment, required all Chinese in the 
United States to carry on their person certificates of residence and 
identity, which required the inclusion of a photograph.43 The Geary Act 
required that the certificates “shall contain the name, age, local residence 
and occupation of the applicant[,]”44 and required “two white witnesses 
to testify to a Chinese person’s immigration status.”45 
By 1892, census data estimated that approximately 110,000 Chinese 
remained lawfully in the United States in the intervening decade after the 
Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882.46 One historian notes that the Geary Act, 
also colloquially referred to as the “Dog Tag Law” at the time of its 
passage,47 reflected a “suspicion Chinese were attempting to enter the 
country under fraudulent pretenses.”48 Falsifying identity documents or 
failing to carry the “certificate of residence” was “a federal crime 
punishable by a year’s imprisonment with hard labor[,]”49 and 
deportation at the expense of those sentenced, because the federal 
 
 39. Aristide R. Zolberg, Matters of State: Theorizing Immigration Policy, in 
THE HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION: THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE 71, 75 
(Charles Hirschman et al. eds., 1999). 
 40. Garfinkel, supra note 32, at 42. 
 41.  Geary Act, ch. 60, 27 Stat. 25 (1892) (amended 1893) (repealed 1943). 
 42. Id. § 1. 
 43. Id.  
 44. Id. § 7. 
 45. PFAELZER, supra note 18, at 296. 
 46. Id. at 291. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Lee, supra note 18, at 41. 
 49. PFAELZER, supra note 18, at 292. 
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government did not have adequate funding to deport those found guilty.50 
Although fifteen states and territories urged Congress and President 
Harrison to engage in full-scale deportation of the remaining 110,000 
Chinese in the country,51 this option was declined due to its 
impracticality in logistics and cost.52 The implementation of an 
identification document and internal “gatekeeping” system under the 
Geary Act was the compromise solution. 
Some members of Congress, however, protested the Geary Act. 
Illinois Representative Robert R. Hitt denounced the Geary Act, drawing 
comparisons between the “Dog Tag Law” with the type of social control 
mechanisms that had been implemented during the slave era.53  
It is proposed to have 100,000 . . . men in our country 
ticketed, tagged, almost branded—the old slavery days 
returned. Never before in a free country was there such a 
system of tagging a man like a dog to be caught by the 
police and examined, and if his tag or collar is not all right, 
taken to the pound or drowned or shot . . . Never before was 
it applied by a free people to a human being with the 
exception (which we can never refer to with pride) of the 
sad days of slavery.54 
A. History of U.S. Immigration Policy and Biometric Vetting 
Consequently, biometric identification played a significant role in 
immigration law at the earliest developments of what is now known as 
the modern federal immigration law scheme. The Chinese Exclusion Act 
required protocols to identify Chinese immigrants. Identification cards 
and immigration screening procedures arose as a method to track, 
inspect, and deport Chinese laborers present in the United States at the 
turn of the century.  
The debates that led to the passage of the Chinese Exclusion Act 
emphasized the perceived threat of Chinese immigrants, with one 
Senator, John Franklin Miller of California, referring to the entry as a 
“Chinese invasion”55 that was a “stealthy, strategic, but peaceful invasion 
 
 50. Id. at 305. 
 51. Id. at 296 (citation omitted). 
 52. Id. at 305 (“Democratic attorney general Richard Olney reported that it 
would cost $6 million to deport unregistered Chinese, and he had only $16,806 left in his 
fund.”) (citation omitted). 
 53. Id. at 296 (citation omitted). 
 54. Id. 
 55. 13 Cong. Rec. 1481–85 (1882) (Remarks of Senator John Franklin Miller of 
California (arguing that a vote against the measure suggests that the United States “is 
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as destructive in its results and more potent for evil than an invasion by 
an army with banners.”56 Senator Miller argued that Chinese immigrants 
with their “peculiar civilization” could overwhelm “the American people 
and Anglo-Saxon civilization,” suggesting that American civilization 
might not endure a wave of Chinese immigration.57  
In the nineteenth century, hysteria about a civilizational threat meant 
that there must be an objective means for “properly identifying” Chinese 
laborers who were in the United States before the Act was passed.58 It 
required the “collector of customs” to list Chinese laborers who were 
about to depart from the United States59 in “registry-books.”60 This 
registration required customs officials to record the “name, age, 
occupation, last place of residence, physical marks of peculiarities, and 
all facts necessary for the identification of such Chinese laborers.”61  
The laborers were entitled to receive a certificate that contained “a 
statement of the name, age, occupation, last place of residence, personal 
description, and facts of identification of the Chinese laborer to whom 
the certificate is issued . . . . ”62 The certificate permitted the laborers to 
return to the United States.63 The certificate system did not apply only to 
Chinese laborers who were entering and exiting the United States. 
Section 6 of the Act also required “every Chinese person other than a 
laborer who may be entitled by said treaty and this act to come within the 
United States” to receive a certificate issued by the Chinese government 
that identified them as an individual entitled to enter the United States.64 
That certificate also required identifying information, including “age, 
height, and all physical peculiarities.”65  
 
now in favor of the unrestricted importation of Chinese; that it looks with favor upon the 
Chinese invasion now in progress.”)).  
 56. Id. at 1482. 
 57. Id. at 1483. (“If we continue to permit the introduction of this strange 
people, with their peculiar civilization, until they form a considerable part of our 
population, what is to be the effect upon the American people and Anglo-Saxon 
civilization? Can these two civilizations endure side by side as two distinct and hostile 
forces? Is American civilization as unimpressible as Chinese civilization? When the end 
comes for one or the other, which will be found to have survived?”).  
 58. Chinese Exclusion Act § 4 (1882) (repealed 1943).  
 59. Per the Act, this was to “furnish [Chinese laborers] . . . with the proper 
evidence of their right to come to the United States of their free will and accord, as 
provided by the treaty between the United States and China.” Id.  
 60. Id.  
 61. Id.  
 62. Id.  
 63. Id.  
 64. Id. § 6. 
 65. Id.  
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Chinese nationals who did not have a required certificate were 
barred entry to the United States, and any “Chinese person found 
unlawfully within the United States shall be caused to be removed from 
the country to whence he came . . . at the cost of the United 
States . . . . ”66 Section 14 of the Act highlighted what Congress 
perceived as the suspect nature of Chinese nationals by prohibiting state 
and federal courts from granting citizenship to Chinese individuals.67 
This continuation of the Chinese Exclusion Act,68 therefore, 
expanded the documentation requirements for Chinese individuals in the 
United States. 69 All Chinese had to carry a registration certificate, which 
showed that they were permitted to be in the United States.70 Chinese 
individuals seeking to acquire U.S. citizenship were required to possess a 
birth certificate that proved that they had been born in the United States, 
and at that time that was “the only route open to the Chinese . . . to 
acquire U.S. citizenship . . . . ”71 The registration requirement was 
“highly controversial” because no other aliens had such registration 
requirements, and the State Department itself was concerned about 
foreign relations.72 
The certificates mandated by the Geary Act contained the same 
information required by the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, including 
“physical peculiarities.”73 Detailed descriptions of physical traits of 
Chinese nationals were considered essential forms of identification.74 
The Acts also focused on social class, as entry restrictions were focused 
on Chinese laborers.75 Individuals in exempt classes—merchants, 
students, teachers, or travelers—received a Section 6 certificate, 
distinguishing them from the laborers.76 
In 1903, customs officers at ports of entry began utilizing the 
Bertillon system as part of a way to record and track Chinese nationals, 
 
 66. Id. § 12. 
 67. Id. §14 (“[H]ereafter no State court or court of the United States shall admit 
Chinese to citizenship; and all laws in conflict with this act are hereby repealed.”).  
 68. Geary Act, ch. 60, 27 Stat. 25 (1892) (amended 1893) (repealed 1943).  
 69. Id.  
 70. Calavita, supra note 26, at 20–21.  
 71. Id. at 21  
 72. Id. at 21 n.15.  
 73. Id. at 21 (“Particularly in the early years before photographs were widely 
available, the designation of ‘physical marks or peculiarities’ was deemed critical.”).  
 74. Id. at 21–22; Jonathan Weinberg, Proving Identity, 44 PEPP. L. REV. 731, 
745–46 (2017).  
 75. Calavita, supra note 26, at 1–2. 
 76. Id. at 21 (“[S]ection 6 certificates issued by the Chinese government 
provided evidence that one belonged to an exempt status—merchant, student, teacher, or 
traveler for pleasure or curiosity.”). 
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particularly laborers,77 based upon French criminologist Alphonse 
Bertillon’s system of measurements in tracking and identifying criminals 
in France.78 Bertillon’s work focused on “practical and administrative” 
aspects of identification.79 Bertillon’s system further relied on 
“anthropometric measurements of arrested persons[,]” “standardized 
photographs” and “verbal portrait[s].”80 These details were listed on 
cards that were filed at police departments, permitting identification and 
tracking of individual arrests.81 Bertillon’s methods have been described 
as a “curious statistical mechanism: that of recording the body’s markers, 
normally common to all, in sufficient detail as to render them specific to 
one.”82 
Bertillon developed a means of standardizing biometric 
identification, now referred to as “Bertillonage.”83 Bertillon’s system 
required measuring parts of the offender’s body, including the head, ears, 
feet, and limbs, as well as eye color, scars, and other physical identifying 
characteristics.84 The system emphasized standardization of the way 
police viewed a suspect and recorded their information, and “archive[d] 
the file on each subject by ‘individualising him in the midst of the 
multitude of human beings.’”85 Bertillonage later added fingerprinting to 
the identification processes.86 The Bertillon system, although relying on 
small data world measurements and observations, represented a means of 
expanding security data. One expert explains: 
By turning the body into code, it had the potential to allow 
security data to travel. . . . [I]t spread from Europe to the 
Americas and along the routes of empire, where fingerprinting 
was simultaneously on the rise . . . . If you were trading under a 
certain name in Bengal in say, 1898 but were an imposter or 
swindler, the Bertillon system promised your undoing. You 
 
 77. Calavita, supra note 26, at 22. 
 78. Weinberg, supra note 74, at 746. 
 79. Mark Maguire, The Birth of Biometric Security, ANTHROPOLOGY TODAY, 
Apr. 2009 at 9, 12. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
 83. BROWNE, supra note 7, at 112.  
 84. Id. 
 85. Maguire, supra note 79, at 12 (quoting ALPHONSE BERTILLON, 
IDENTIFICATION ANTHROPOMETRIQUE: INSTRUCTIONS SIGNALETIQUES 4 (1893)). 
 86. Id. at 13. 
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had, even in the 19th century, a modern shadow—a so-called 
data double.87 
Bertillon’s work has been characterized as “less of a triumph in science 
and more of a triumph in filing[,]”88 but the standardization of 
identification and characteristics, and emphasis on administrative 
governance is echoed in modern big data biometric cybersurveillance. 
The use of the Bertillon system in tracking and identifying Chinese 
nationals in the United States is of interest because it suggests that such 
immigrants were inherently suspect. The system was developed for use 
in identifying arrested individuals and criminals.89 The Department of 
Commerce and Labor issued extensive guidelines for utilizing the 
Bertillon system in identifying Chinese laborers, specifying highly 
detailed measurements.90 External identifiers, including class, were also 
important indicators for physical identification,91 and customs officials 
could deny entry to individuals who held Section 6 certificates if the 
customs officials believed that their physical characteristics and 
appearances indicated they were truly laborers.92 
The Geary Act also required Chinese laborers who were entitled to 
be in the United States to apply for a certificate of residence.93 The 
laborer was required to prove his entitlement to remain in the United 
States.94 The Secretary of the Treasury prescribed rules and regulations 
for proof sufficient to receive a certificate.95 The regulations required that 
“the fact of residence shall be proved by ‘at least one credible witness of 
good character,’ or, in case of necessity, by other proof.”96 Failure to 
obtain or apply for a certificate within the year after the Geary Act was 
passed was evidence that the Chinese laborer was not lawfully present in 
the United States, and was not entitled to remain, thus subjecting him to 
deportation.97 A laborer could not circumvent deportation unless he 
could establish a valid reason for his failure to obtain a certificate such as 
accident or illness, such evidence had to be “‘to the satisfaction of the 
 
 87. Id.  
 88. Id. at 12. 
 89. Weinberg, supra note 74, at 746. 
 90. See Calavita, supra note 26, at 22–23 (quoting extensively from the 1903 
guidelines that specified how to measure Chinese immigrants and laborers). 
 91. Id. at 24. 
 92. Id. at 24–25, 24 & n.19. 
 93. See Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 726 (1893). 
 94. Id. (“[B]y making it the duty of the Chinese laborer to apply to the collector 
of internal revenue of the district for a certificate, necessarily implies a correlative duty of 
the collector to grant him a certificate, upon due proof of the requisite facts.”). 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. at 727.  
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court, and [supported] by at least one credible white witness, 
[demonstrating] that he was a resident of the United States at the time of 
the passage of this act.’”98 
Challenges to the Geary Act on substantive due process and other 
constitutional grounds failed. In Fong Yue Ting v. United States,99 the 
Supreme Court concluded that “[t]he power to exclude or to expel aliens, 
being a power affecting international relations, is vested in the political 
departments of the government[.]”100 “The right of a nation to expel or 
deport foreigners,” explained the Court, is “absolute and 
unqualified[,]”101 and the plenary power doctrine, an idea that the federal 
immigration power flowed from “unlimited inherent sovereign 
powers[,]” was cemented.102 Justice Brewer dissented: “This doctrine of 
powers inherent in sovereignty is one both indefinite and dangerous. 
Where are the limits to such powers to be found, and by whom are they 
to be pronounced?”103 
The Court further upheld the validity of requiring certificates of 
residence,104 explaining that Congress had the right to “expel aliens of a 
particular class, or permit them to remain, has undoubtedly the right to 
provide a system of registration and identification of the members of that 
class within the country, and to take all proper means to carry out the 
system which it provides.”105 The Court acknowledged that the effect of 
the Geary Act was to create a presumption that any Chinese laborer 
without a residence certificate in the United States was presumed not to 
be entitled to be in the United States.106 The Court found that the 
procedures afforded to Chinese nationals were sufficient—despite the 
fact that the burden of proof rested solely on the Chinese individual to 
prove that suspicion did not apply.107 This burden, as well as the 
requirement of a “credible white witness,” the Court explained “is within 
the acknowledged power of every legislature to prescribe the evidence 
which shall be received, and the effect of that evidence, in the courts of 
 
 98. Id.  
 99. 149 U.S. 698 (1893). 
 100. Id. at 713. 
 101. Id. at 707. 
 102. Gabriel J. Chin, Chae Chan Ping and Fong Yue Ting: The Origins of 
Plenary Power, in IMMIGRATION LAW STORIES 7 (David A. Martin & Peter Schuck eds., 
2005). See also Sarah H. Cleveland, Powers Inherent in Sovereignty: Indians, Aliens, 
Territories and the Nineteenth Century Origins of Plenary Power Over Foreign Affairs, 
81 TEX. L. REV. 1 (2002). 
 103. Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 737. 
 104. Id. at 698. 
 105. Id. at 714. 
 106. Id. at 728. 
 107. Id. at 729.  
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its own government.”108 Witness competency—even a requirement of a 
witness’s race, the Court stated, was a matter for Congress to decide.109  
The Court’s ruling suggested that Chinese individuals’ testimony 
was less trustworthy. The Court deferred heavily to Congress.110 Quoting 
Justice Field’s opinion in Chae Chan Ping v. United States,111 the Court 
explained that Congress may have required a white witness because in 
prior cases, “the testimony of Chinese persons admitted to prove similar 
facts ‘was attended with great embarrassment, from the suspicious 
nature, in many instances, of the testimony offered to establish the 
residence of the parties, arising from the loose notions entertained by the 
witnesses of the obligation of an oath.’”112 
Justice Brewer dissented, arguing that there is no “arbitrary and 
unrestrained power to banish residents, even resident aliens.”113 Under 
Justice Brewer’s perspective, because the Fourteenth Amendment 
applied to “persons,” then it applied to “all persons lawfully within the 
territory of the United States” and thus, residents of the United States—
including Chinese nationals who were lawfully present—were entitled to 
its protections.114 Justice Brewer argued that Section 6 of the Geary Act 
violated the Fourteenth Amendment because it “imposes punishment 
without a trial, and punishment cruel and severe. It places the liberty of 
one individual subject to the unrestrained control of another.”115 Justice 
Brewer’s opinion was not written out of any feelings of racial 
inequality—he expressed anti-Chinese sentiments throughout, stating 
that Chinese nationals in the United States obtained constitutional 
protections “by sufferance and not of right.”116  
Yet, his concern was about broader democratic norms. If Congress 
exercised this power, he reasoned, “[W]ho shall say it will not be 
exercised to-morrow against other classes and other people? If the 
guaranties of these amendments can be thus ignored in order to get rid of 
a distasteful class what security have others that a like disregard of its 
 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. (“The competency of all witnesses, without regard to their color, to 
testify in the courts of the United States, rests on acts of Congress, which Congress may, 
at its discretion, modify or repeal.”).  
 110. Id. (“[R]equiring a Chinese alien, claiming the privilege of remaining in the 
United States, to prove the fact of his residence here at the time of the passage of the act 
‘by at least one credible white witness’ may have been the experience of congress[.]”). 
Id. 
 111. 130 U.S. 581 (1889).  
 112. Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 730 (quoting Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 
598).  
 113. Id. at 738 (Brewer, J., dissenting).  
 114. Id. at 739 (Brewer, J., dissenting).  
 115. Id. at 739–40 (Brewer, J., dissenting).  
 116. Id. at 743 (Brewer, J., dissenting).  
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provisions may not be resorted to?”117 Justice Field also dissented, 
rejecting the majority’s conclusion “that ‘congress, under the power to 
exclude or expel aliens, might have directed any Chinese laborer found 
in the United States without a certificate of residence to be removed out 
of the country by executive officers, without judicial trial or examination, 
just as it might have authorized such officers absolutely to prevent his 
entrance into the country.’”118 Justice Field argued that expelling 
residents of the United States (even foreign nationals) without 
constitutional compliance demonstrated “an unlimited and despotic 
power.”119 Justice Field dissented vehemently from the procedures set 
forth, particularly the shift in burden of proof, as well as the “credible 
white witness” requirement.120 
Regardless of how the Chinese Exclusion Acts fared before the 
Court, mechanically, it entailed identifying one by national origin 
through an attempt at a systemic accumulation of data that was both 
biometric and biographical. The Bertillon system was, in short, an 
attempt to systematize identity management. While the acquisition of 
data about an individual serves to facilitate recognition, it also enables 
analysis. Biometric and biographical data on Chinese immigrants 
enabled the government to begin generalizing and classifying the kinds 
of characteristics that might be typical of the class subject to this 
surveillance. That, in turn, facilitated administrative decisionmaking; for 
example, distinguishing between skilled and unskilled laborers, and 
enabled inferences of criminality and national security concerns. Finally, 
that administrative decision making facilitated preferential immigration 
decisions. 
Thus, one of the earliest manifestations of the conflation of crime, 
immigration, and national security policy could be seen through the 
development of an identity management system of Chinese immigrants 
in the United States. The crimmigration-counterrorism phenomena, now 
reflected in extreme vetting, is a contemporary example of this troubling 
 
 117. Id. (Brewer, J., dissenting).  
 118. Id. at 755 (Field, J., dissenting).  
 119. Id. at 756 (Field, J., dissenting).  
 120. Id. at 759–60 (Field, J., dissenting).  
Here the government undertakes to exact of the party arrested the 
testimony of a witness of a particular color, though conclusive and 
incontestable testimony from others may be adduced. The law might 
as well have said that unless the laborer should also present a 
particular person as a witness who could not be produced, from 
sickness, absence, or other cause, such as the archbishop of the State, 
to establish the fact of residence, he should be held to be unlawfully 
within the United States. 
Id. (Field, J., dissenting). 
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policymaking evolution. Unlike past methods, such as the Bertillon 
system, modern iterations embrace biometric ID cybersurveillance.  
B. Biometric Identification and Immigration Vetting after the Chinese 
Exclusion Act 
At the turn of the century, there was a great national debate on 
immigration that went beyond the exclusion of the Chinese. Through 
publications of essays such as The Control of Trends in the Racial 
Composition of the American People and other academic discussions, 
immigration policy debates focused on “Old Stock” or “Native Stock” 
Americans—Western and Northern Europeans—and “New Stock” or 
“Immigrant Stock” Americans—Southern and Eastern Europeans.121 The 
census statistics of 1910 and 1920 showed a dramatic rise in “New 
Stock” Americans.122 “Between 1900 and 1910 the origin of the 
American people, as between old and new stock, passed below the fifty 
percent line.”123 The results of the 1910 census were published in 
1913.124 Congress responded with several immigration reform bills in the 
1920s. The Quota Act of 1921125 and National Origins Act of 1924126 
were designed to restrict the number of immigrants allowed from 
Central, Southern, and Eastern Europe, and set the quota for immigrants 
from East, South, Southeast, and Central Asia and all other “Oriental 
countries” at nearly zero.127 The “quota” system of federal immigration 
policy was not lifted until 1965.128 
In the 1920s and 1930s, the Chinese population of the United States 
plummeted.129 There was a sharp rise, however, in immigrants from 
Eastern and Southern Europe. In 1939, Pennsylvania passed an “Alien 
Registration Act,” which required that every immigrant in the state 
register with the state annually, “provide such information as is required 
by the statute,” and pay an annual registration fee.130 In addition, the 
 
 121. Harry H. Laughlin, The Control of Trends in the Racial Composition of the 
American, in THE ALIEN IN OUR MIDST 158 (Madison Grant & Chas. Stewart Davison 
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 122. Id. at 159–60.  
 123. Id. at 159. 
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 129. See, e.g., HING, supra note 17, at 42. 
 130. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 59 (1941) (citing 35 Pa. Stat. Ann. §§ 
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Pennsylvania law required that the immigrant “receive an alien 
identification card and carry it all times; show the card whenever it may 
be demanded by any police officer or any agent of the Department of 
Labor and Industry; and exhibit the card as a condition precedent to 
registering a motor vehicle in his name or obtaining a license to operate 
one.”131 Failure to register could result in “a fine of not more than $100 
or imprisonment for not more than 60 days.”132 Failure to carry or show 
the card “upon proper demand” could result in “a fine of not more than 
$10, or imprisonment for not more than 10 days, or both.”133 Shortly 
thereafter, in Hines v. Davidowitz,134 the Supreme Court struck down the 
Pennsylvania law on preemption grounds, finding that the state statute 
interfered with the exclusive power of the federal government to regulate 
“the rights, privileges, obligations or burdens of aliens[.]”135 
Congress followed Pennsylvania in the enactment of the Alien 
Registration Act of 1940.136 Congress utilized the most advanced 
biometric technology available at the time in developing a national 
registration program for immigrants. The national identity registry 
required the fingerprinting of nearly 5 million foreign nationals during 
World War II.137 Database sorting technology made possible through the 
U.S. Census Bureau’s usage of the Hollerith machine, combined with the 
alien registration protocol, allowed for the identification of Japanese-
Americans for internment purposes.138 
After the Pearl Harbor attack on December 7, 1941, state and local 
governments began enacting laws and ordinances targeting Japanese 
Americans and immigrants from Japan residing in the United States.139 
Subsequently, Executive Order 9,066, signed by President Roosevelt in 
1942,140 ordered the internment of approximately 112,000 Japanese 
Americans; a majority of them, an estimated 70,000, were U.S. 
 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. at 59–60. 
 133. Id. at 60. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. at 63–64. 
 136. Alien Registration (Smith) Act of 1940, ch. 439, 54 Stat. 670 (1940).  
 137. Will Maslow, Recasting Our Deportation Law: Proposals for Reform, 56 
COLUM. L. REV. 309, 338 (1956) (“In 1940, the Alien Registration Act required every 
alien fourteen years of age or older to be fingerprinted and to disclose the essential facts 
about his immigration status. As a result, 4,800,000 aliens registered.”). 
 138. See, e.g., GARFINKEL supra note 32, at 17–18; Haya El Nasser, Papers Show 
Census Role in WWII Camps, USA TODAY (Mar. 30, 2007, 1:33 AM), 
http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/nation/2007-03-30-census-role_N.htm 
[https://perma.cc/SF93-CSCY].  
 139. See, e.g., Yamamoto, supra note 139 at 100–01. 
 140. Executive Order 9,066, 7 Fed. Reg. 1407 (Feb. 25, 1942); See also 
Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 85 (1943); Yamamoto, supra note 139. 
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citizens.141 This same database technology and protocol was used to 
identify Italian-Americans and German-Americans as well. During 
World War II, over 600,000 Italian-born and 300,000 German-born 
United States resident aliens and their families were mandated to carry 
Certificates of Identification.142 
After World War II, there was a consensus that the United States 
needed a comprehensive and uniform immigration regulation policy.143 
On September 4, 1952, President Truman appointed the President’s 
Commission on Immigration and Naturalization to make 
recommendations “designed to eliminate from our immigration laws the 
unfortunate provisions which apply discriminations based on national 
origin, race, creed and color; and to substitute provisions worthy of our 
people and our form of government.”144  
C. Biometric Identification under Extreme Vetting Protocols  
Expanding upon past immigration and citizenship identification 
protocols, in the aftermath of the terrorist acts of September 11, 2001, the 
newly-created U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has been 
developing technologically advanced forms of screening and vetting. 
These new DHS vetting protocols are based on sources that include 
DHS-published materials describing current refugee vetting processes 
and interviews with experts familiar with the refugee vetting protocols 
established under the Obama Administration.145 Extreme vetting will 
entail biometric database screening and other enhanced database 
screening protocols.146 Currently, immigration-related vetting protocols 
 
 141. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 241–42 (1944) (Murphy, J., 
dissenting). (“It seems incredible that under these circumstances it would have been 
impossible to hold loyalty hearing for the mere 112,000 persons involved—or at least for 
the 70,000 American citizens—especially when a large part of this number represented 
children and elderly men and women.”). 
 142. Wartime Treatment Study Act, S. 621, 110th Cong. § 2 (2007). 
 143. U.S. IMMIGRATION IN THE 1980S: REAPPRAISAL AND REFORM 3 (David 
Simcox ed., 1988).  
 144. Special Message to the Congress Transmitting Report of the President's 




 145. See generally Office of Biometric Identity Management, U.S. DEP’T OF 
HOMELAND SEC., https://www.dhs.gov/obim [https://perma.cc/ZH3C-F8WZ]. 
 146. See, e.g., Exec. Order, Oct. 27, Enhanced Vetting; see also Ann M. 
Simmons, We Don't Know Exactly What 'Extreme Vetting' Will Look Like, But Screening 
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often begin with biographic identification—for example, in-person 
interviews combined with screening paper documents such as birth 
certificates, travel and work visas, passports, and other government-
issued documents;147 as well as biometric identification—for example, 
the collection and database screening of scanned fingerprints and irises, 
digital photographs for facial recognition technology, and DNA.148 
Biometric data collection occurs at the earliest stages of refugee 
vetting. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) 
recommends qualified refugees to the United States and other 
cooperating countries for resettlement and is tasked with conducting the 
initial assessment of whether an applicant qualifies for refugee status 
under international laws.149 UNHCR “collects identity documents [such 
as visas and passports, if available], biographical information, and 
biometric data, such as iris scans for Syrians.”150 DHS also reportedly 
collects DNA at specific refugee camps.151 
Experts have explained that refugees are subjected to a “21-step 
screening process.”152 The vetting protocols for refugees are described by 
experts as already “extreme” and “among the most rigorous for anyone 
seeking to enter the United States.”153 Once referred by UNHCR for 
refugee resettlement in the United States, applicants are referred to 
support centers, contracted by the U.S. Department of State to compile 
and process refugee’s personal data.154 The U.S. Department of State 
 
 147. See Refugee Processing and Security Screening, U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND 
IMMIGRATION SERV., https://www.uscis.gov/refugeescreening [https://perma.cc/2BHS-
P696]. 
 148. Hu, Biometric ID, supra note 1. 
 149. Simmons, supra note 146. 
 150. Id. 
 151. Shane Bauer, The FBI is Very Excited About This Machine That Can Scan 
Your DNA in 90 Minutes, MOTHER JONES (Nov. 20, 2014, 11:30 AM), 
http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2014/11/rapid-dna-profiles-database-fbi-police 
[https://perma.cc/7ZTU-C63B] (“The US government will soon test the [Rapid-DNA] 
machine in refugee camps in Turkey and possibly Thailand on families seeking asylum in 
the United States, according to Chris Miles, manager of the Department of Homeland 
Security's biometrics program.”).  
 152. Del Quentin Wilber & Brian Bennett, Federal Agents are Reinvestigating 
Syrian Refugees in U.S. Who May Have Slipped through Vetting Lapse, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 
25, 2017, 9:55 AM), http://www.latimes.com/politics/la-na-syria-refugees-vetting-gap-
20170125-story.html [https://perma.cc/9D4L-CERE]. 
 153. Id. See also Simmons, supra note 146; Interview by John Burnett of Leon 
Rodriguez, Former Head of Dep’t of Homeland Security’s Immigration Serv., in All 
Things Considered: Former Immigration Director Defends U.S. Record on Refugee 
Vetting (NPR Feb. 3, 2017), http://www.npr.org/2017/02/03/513311323/former-
immigration-director-defends-u-s-record-on-refugee-vetting [https://perma.cc/PG9K-
XCL6].  
 154. Simmons, supra note 146. 
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checks the refugee’s name against digital watchlisting systems operated 
by the military and the intelligence communities.155 The National 
Counterterrorism Center conducts interagency checks, such as for 
 
 155. U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERV., supra note 147. DHS explains 
that the following State Department checks are involved in refugee vetting protocols:  
The Department of State’s Consular Lookout and Support System (CLASS): 
§ State initiates CLASS name checks for all refugee applicants when 
they are being prescreened by an RSC. Name checks are conducted on 
the applicant’s primary names as well as any variations used by the 
applicant. Responses are received before the USCIS interview, and 
possible matches are reviewed and adjudicated by USCIS 
headquarters. Evidence of the response is included in the case file. If a 
new name or variation is identified at the interview, USCIS requests 
another CLASS name check on the new name and places the case on 
hold until that response is received. 
§ CLASS is owned by State. The name-check database provides access 
to critical information for adjudicating immigration applications. The 
system contains records provided by numerous agencies and includes 
information on individuals who have been denied visas, immigration 
violations, criminal histories, and terrorism concerns, as well as 
intelligence information and child support enforcement data. 
§ In addition to containing information from State sources, CLASS also 
includes information from: 
- National Counterterrorism Center/Terrorist Screening 
Center (terrorist watch lists); 
- TECS; 
- Interpol; 
- Drug Enforcement Administration; 
- Health and Human Services; and 
- FBI (extracts of the National Crime Information Center’s 
Wanted Persons File, Immigration Violator File, Foreign 
Fugitive File, Violent Gang and Terrorist Organization 
File (and the Interstate Identification Index)). 
Security Advisory Opinion (SAO): 
State initiates SAO name checks for certain refugee applicants when 
they are being prescreened by an RSC. The SAO biographic check is 
conducted by the FBI and intelligence community partners. SAOs are 
conducted for an applicant who is a member of a group or nationality 
that the U.S. government has designated as requiring this higher level 
check. SAOs are processed, and a response must be received before 
finalizing the decision. If there is a new name or variation identified at 
the interview, USCIS requests another SAO for the new name and 
places the case on hold until that response is received. 
The SAO process was implemented after September 11th, 2001, to provide an additional 
security mechanism to screen individuals in certain higher-risk categories who are 
seeking to enter the United States through a variety of means, including refugee 
applicants. Id. 
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military-age males, to determine if “derogatory information” disqualifies 
the applicant.156 
The results of those checks are passed along to the DHS Office of 
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, which assigns officers to 
travel to foreign countries to interview the refugees to assess the 
applicant’s credibility.157 The screening process includes background 
security clearance checks through an Interagency Check158 and an in-
person interview with the DHS Office of U.S. Citizenship and 
Immigration Services.159 
In addition to extensive interviews, the applicant’s fingerprints and 
digital photographs are screened. Fingerprints of the applicant, for 
example, are screened through intelligence and military databases 
operated by the FBI, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, the 
Department of Defense, and other databases.160 The applicant is also 
 
 156. Id.  
 157. Wilber & Bennett, supra note 152. 
 158. U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERV., supra note 147. DHS explains 
that the Interagency Check protocol involves prescreening by intelligence community 
partners: 
Interagency Check (IAC): 
The IAC screens biographic data, including names, dates of birth, and 
other additional data of all refugee applicants within designated age 
ranges. This information is captured at the time the applicant is 
prescreened and is provided to intelligence community partners. This 
screening procedure began in 2008 and has expanded over time to 
include a broader range of applicants and records. These checks occur 
throughout the process. 
Id. 
 159.  Id. 
 160.  DHS explains that the following biometric database screening is involved 
in refugee vetting protocols: 
At the time of USCIS interview, USCIS staff collects fingerprints and begins 
biometric checks. These checks include: 
§ FBI Fingerprint Check through Next Generation Identification (NGI); 
- Recurring biometric record checks pertaining to criminal 
history and previous immigration data. 
§ DHS Automated Biometric Identification System (IDENT - f/n/a US-
VISIT); 
- A biometric record check related to travel and immigration 
history as well as immigration violations, and law enforcement 
and national security concerns. Enrollment in IDENT also 
allows U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) to confirm 
the applicant’s identity at U.S. ports of entry; and 
§ DOD Defense Forensics and Biometrics Agency (DFBA)’s Automated 
Biometric Identification System (ABIS).  
- A biometric record check of the Department of Defense’s 
(DOD) records collected in areas of conflict. 
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screened through various medical tests to ensure that he or she is free of 
any communicable diseases.161 “Syrian refugees referred for resettlement 
in the United States face additional screening.162 Only then is the 
applicant’s status conditionally approved for resettlement and submitted 
to the U.S. State Department for final processing.”163 
If the applicant is able to pass security and medical screening, the 
refugee is approved for resettlement. According to U.S. State Department 
data, the entire screening process takes at least 18 months to two years.164 
John Sandweg, former DHS Acting General Counsel and former DHS 
Acting Director of Immigration and Customs Enforcement, explained 
that it was difficult for him to conceive of how the vetting protocols 
could be made more rigorous by the Trump administration, given the 
rigorousness of the present system.165 
Importantly, Sandweg described the vetting procedures in place as 
involving the efforts of multiple intelligence agencies, U.S. Department 
of Defense, and other law enforcement databases at the federal and state 
level. He stated, “‘There are individuals who are collecting information 
on the battlefield, from sources and electronic intercepts. That is all fed 
into the refugee screening process[.]’”166 DHS specifies that vetting of 
refugees includes “[a] biometric record check of the [U.S.] Department 
of Defense’s (DOD) records collected in areas of conflict (predominantly 
Iraq and Afghanistan). DOD screening began in 2007 for Iraqi applicants 
and has now been expanded to all nationalities.”167 
DHS explains that vetting uses both classified and unclassified 
databases for biometric and biographic screening, corroborating that 
vetting involves intelligence tools.168 Specifically, according to one 
media report, “U.S. intelligence agents cross-check[] refugees’ names 
and biographical information against CIA databases[.]”169 Database 
screening systems “automatically inspect data contained in ‘attachments’ 
to the records, the officials said. Such attachments can include cellphone 
numbers, address books, social media postings, arrest reports and 
 
Id. 
 161. Simmons, supra note 146. 
 162. Id. 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id.  
 167. U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERV., supra note 147. 
 168. Id. (“CBP’s [DHS Customs and Border Patrol] National Targeting Center-
Passenger (NTC-P) conducts biographic vetting of all ABIS biometric matches against 
various classified and unclassified U.S. government databases.”) 
 169. Wilber & Bennett, supra note 152. 
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intelligence assessments[.]”170 Thus, United States law enforcement and 
intelligence officials screen individuals through the classified databases 
of the CIA, FBI, and National Counterterrorism Center; the military 
databases of the U.S. Department of Defense; and the civilian databases 
of the U.S. Department of State and DHS.171 
It is worth noting that the vetting protocols involve continuous 
monitoring, and tracking of the refugee even persists after the applicant 
is approved for entry. The refugee faces additional interviews and 
screening upon entry to the United States. “‘The individuals are 
recurrently vetted even after they are in the United States,’ Sandweg 
said. ‘You are constantly running them through a database to see if any 
new information has come in to say that they are a threat.’”172 
In this sense, a registry of sorts already exists insofar as, once a 
refugee enters the surveillance system, they get no exit. Nevertheless, the 
Trump administration envisions something more expansive. On 
November 15, 2016, an immigration adviser to then-President-Elect 
Donald Trump explained to Reuters News Service that the incoming 
administration was considering the development of a Muslim “database” 
or “registry” of Muslim immigrants residing in the United States.173 
According to the media report: “Kansas Secretary of State Kris Kobach, 
who helped write tough immigration laws in Arizona [Arizona’s SB 
1070] and elsewhere, said in an interview that Trump’s policy advisers 
had also discussed drafting a proposal for his consideration to reinstate a 
registry for immigrants from Muslim countries.”174 The reinstatement of 
a Muslim registry or Muslim database screening system was a reference 
to a discontinued Bush Administration program named the “National 
Security Entry-Exit Registration System,” a biometric database screening 




 170. Id. 
 171. Id. 
 172. Simmons, supra note 146. 
 173. Mica Rosenberg & Julia Edwards Ainsley, Immigration Hardliner Says 
Trump Team Preparing Plans for Wall, Mulling Muslim Registry, REUTERS (Nov. 15, 
2016, 7:45 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump-immigration-
idUSKBN13B05C?feedType=RSS&feedName=politicsNews&utm_source=Twitter&ut
m_medium=Social [https://perma.cc/4AWV-38SK]. 
 174. Id. 
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II. IMPLEMENTING CRIMMIGRATION-COUNTERTERRORISM THROUGH 
THE MUSLIM BAN, THE TRAVEL BAN, AND EXTREME VETTING 
A. The Muslim Ban  
Then-candidate Trump’s original call for a “Muslim Ban” occurred 
on December 7, 2015, following terrorist attacks in Paris and San 
Bernardino, when he published a “Statement on Preventing Muslim 
Immigration” on his campaign website.176 The statement explained that 
Trump was “calling for a total and complete shutdown of Muslims 
entering the United States until our country’s representatives can figure 
out what is going on.”177  
The Muslim Ban, as initially proposed during the campaign, was 
intended to prohibit any Muslim from entering the United States.178 
Trump subsequently explained that it would be a temporary ban, which 
would permit the government to execute an assessment of immigration 
procedures, and “suspend immigration from regions linked with 
terrorism . . . ”179 He also argued that surveillance of Muslims and 
mosques was necessary, linking domestic surveillance and foreign 
vetting as one integral policy.180 
In response to challenges that banning individuals from entry to the 
United States based on religion was inconsistent with the Constitution, 
then-candidate Trump suggested that it would instead be based on 
territory.181 In an interview with NBC’s Meet the Press, Trump explained 
that, “We must immediately suspend immigration from any nation that 
has been compromised by terrorism until such time as proven vetting 
 
 176. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 857 F.3d 554, 575 (4th Cir. 
2017) (en banc); see also Fred Barbash, Muslim Ban Language Suddenly Disappears 
from Trump Campaign Website After Spicer Questioned, WASH. POST (May 9, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2017/05/09/trumps-preventing-
muslim-immigration-vow-disappears-from-campaign-website-after-spicer-
questioned/?utm_term=.2411d4837bec [https://perma.cc/7JHW-LFW8].  
 177. Barbash, supra note 176. (Statement of Donald J. Trump, on Preventing 
Muslim Immigration (Dec. 7, 2015)). The statement was available on the campaign 
website until shortly before oral argument before the Fourth Circuit in International 
Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump. See Int’l Refugee Assistance Project, 857 F.3d at 
575 n.5.  
 178. Id.  
 179. Associated Press, How Donald Trump’s Plan to Ban Muslims Has Evolved, 
FORTUNE (June 28, 2016), http://fortune.com/2016/06/28/donald-trump-muslim-ban/ 
[https://perma.cc/7VVE-QCKU]. 
 180. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project, 857 F.3d at 576; see also David Mark & 
Jeremy Diamond, Trump: ‘I Want Surveillance of Certain Mosques’, CNN (Nov. 21, 
2015, 7:25 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2015/11/21/politics/trump-muslims-surveillance/ 
[https://perma.cc/Y5AS-UASF]. 
 181. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project, 857 F.3d at 576.  
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mechanisms have been put in place.”182 Trump stated that the shift to 
nation-based exclusion was an “expansion” and that he was “talking 
territory instead of Muslim.”183 Thus, even as the proposed policy 
purportedly shifted to more defensible legal grounds—targeting specific 
countries rather than an entire religion based on a country-by-country 
risk assessment—rhetorically broadened the divide, encompassing not 
only Muslims, but also their associates residing in countries subject to 
Islamic influence. In this way, the proposed ban continued to be 
animated by—while also animating—cultural phobia of Muslims. 
In a further expansion of his arguments for stricter scrutiny of 
immigrants, candidate Trump announced a proposal for “extreme 
vetting” during a campaign speech in August 2016.184 He explained that, 
“In the Cold War, we had an ideological screening test. The time is 
overdue to develop a new screening test for the threats we face today. I 
call it extreme vetting.”185 As a candidate, Trump also endorsed a 
“biometric entry-exit system for tracking visa-holders.”186 
B. The Travel Ban  
In his first week in office, President Trump signed three Executive 
Orders that implemented various aspects of immigration-related 
campaign promises that had been articulated prior to his election. On 
January 25, 2017, President Trump issued two Executive Orders titled, 
“Border Security and Immigration Enforcement Improvements, 
Executive Order 13,767,”187 and “Enhancing Public Safety in the Interior 
of the United States, Executive Order 13,768.”188 The former stated that 
it was “the policy of the executive branch to . . . secure the southern 
 
 182. Meet the Press - July 24, 2016, NBC NEWS (July 24, 2016, 11:47 AM), 
http://www.nbcnews.com/meet-the-press/meet-press-july-24-2016-n615706 
[https://perma.cc/DH2W-5UHJ]. 
 183. Id.  
 184. Donald J. Trump, Remarks at Youngstown State University in Youngstown, 
Ohio (August 15, 2016) (transcript by Gerhard Peters & John T. Woolley, The American 
Presidency Project, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=119503 
[https://perma.cc/8NBQ-8B9U]. 
 185. Id.  
 186. Emily Schultheis, Donald Trump Doubles Down in Immigration Speech: 
“Mexico Will Pay for the Wall”, CBS NEWS (Aug. 31, 2016, 10:06 PM), 
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/donald-trump-delivers-immigration-speech-in-phoenix/ 
[https://perma.cc/ZF7E-X2FE]. 
 187. Border Security and Immigration Enforcement Improvements, Exec. Order 
No. 13,767, 82 Fed. Reg. 18, 8793 (Jan. 30, 2017) [hereinafter Exec. Order, Jan. 30, 
Border Security]. 
 188. Enhancing Public Safety in the Interior of the United States, Exec. Order 
No. 13,768, 82 Fed. Reg. 18, 8799 (Jan. 30, 2017) [hereinafter Exec. Order, Jan. 30, 
Interior Public Safety]. 
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border of the United States through the immediate construction of a 
physical wall” between the United States and Mexico.189 The latter 
threatened the loss of federal funding for “sanctuary” jurisdictions, those 
state and local governments refusing to cooperate with the federal 
government in the detention and deportation of undocumented 
immigrants. 190 
Two days later, on January 27, 2017, President Trump issued a third 
Executive Order, Executive Order 13,769, promulgating immigration 
policy, titled, “Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry into 
the United States.”191 The January 27, 2017, Order barred the admission 
of all refugees to the United States for 120 days,192 and excluded 
immigration from seven countries: Iran, Iraq, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, 
Syria, and Yemen.193 It indefinitely suspended refugees from Syria.194 
Further, it asserted that immigration from those countries was 
“detrimental to the interests of the United States” and suspended 
immigration from those countries for ninety days while visa protocols 
were scrutinized.195 
Trump explained in a television interview on the Christian 
Broadcasting Network that the January 27, 2017, Order would afford 
greater protection to Christians.196 Specifically, the Executive Order 
stated that prioritization would be granted to refugee applicants seeking 
relief from religious-based persecution if they demonstrated that they 
were among the religious minority in the Muslim-majority countries 
impacted by the Order.197 The Order further lowered the refugee cap in 
2017 to 50,000 refugees, down from the 85,000 refugee cap set by the 
Obama Administration for 2016.198 State and local jurisdictions also 
enjoyed an expanded role in the process of refugee resettlement under 
the Order,199 likely in response to multiple lawsuits brought by states 
seeking to prevent the resettlement of Syrian refugees in those states, 
 
 189. Exec. Order, Jan. 30, Border Security at 8793. 
 190. Exec. Order, Jan. 30, Interior Public Safety at 8801. 
 191. Exec. Order, Jan. 27, Travel Ban I. 
 192. Id. at 8979. 
 193. Exec. Order, Mar. 6, Travel Ban II. 
 194. Exec. Order, Jan. 27, Travel Ban I at 8979. 
 195. Id. at 8978. 
 196. See, e.g., Daniel Burke, Trump Says US Will Prioritize Christian Refugees, 
CNN, (Jan. 30, 2017, 11:28 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2017/01/27/politics/trump-
christian-refugees/ [https://perma.cc/MBB4-7S99]. 
 197. Exec. Order, Jan. 27, Travel Ban I at 8979. 
 198. Id.  
 199. Id. at 8980 
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including a lawsuit involving then-Governor Mike Pence’s efforts to bar 
Syrian refugees from the state of Indiana.200 
In response to ongoing litigation that had temporarily suspended the 
January 27, 2017, Order,201 on March 6, 2017, President Trump reissued 
this Executive Order, Executive Order 13,780, under the same title, 
“Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry into the United 
States” (“March 6, 2017, Order”).202 The March 6, 2017, Order was more 
limited, and significantly modified the provisions that had restricted 
travel and refugee relief. The revised Order no longer included Iraq,203 
thereby restricting travel by citizens from six countries: Iran, Libya, 
Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen.204 The March 6, 2017, Order no 
longer indefinitely suspended refugee relief for Syrian refugees, and 
instead subjected Syrian refugees to the provision of the order that bars 
admission of all refugees to the United States for 120 days.205 In addition, 
it did not offer refugee relief preferences on the basis of minority 
religious persecution.206 The March 6, 2017, Order expressly identified 
those who would not face a “suspension of entry” pursuant to the order, 
including: lawful permanent residents,207 dual nationals,208 diplomats,209 
and those who had been granted valid visas,210 and asylum or refugee 
status prior to implementation of the order.211  
The revised March 6, 2017, Order, like the original, stated that 
temporarily suspending refugee relief and banning travel into the United 
States by nationals and citizens of the “countries of concern” would 
allow time to develop more stringent vetting procedures.212 It explained 
that the “countries of concern” were previously identified in the Visa 
Waiver Program, enacted in 2015 through the Visa Waiver Program 
Improvement and Terrorist Travel Prevention Act.213 The March 6, 2017, 
Order specified that “[u]niform [s]creening and [v]etting [s]tandards for 
 
 200. See Exodus Refugee Immigration, Inc. v. Pence, 838 F.3d 902, 902 (7th Cir. 
2016). 
 201. See supra notes 27–31 and accompanying text.  
 202. Exec. Order, Mar. 6, Travel Ban II. 
 203. Id. at 13211–12 
 204. Id. at 13210–11 
 205. Id. at 13215. 
 206. Id. at 13210. 
 207. Id. at 13213. 
 208. Id. at 13213–14. 
 209. Id.  
 210. Id.  
 211. Id.  
 212. Id. 13209–11, 13215; see also Exec. Order, Jan. 27, Travel Ban I. 
 213. Exec. Order, Mar. 6, Travel Ban II at 13209 (citing Visa Waiver Program 
Improvement and Terrorist Travel Prevention Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114–13 § 203, 
129 Stat. 2988–91 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1187(a)(12) (D)(ii)(Supp. III 2015))). 
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all [i]mmigration [p]rograms” would be developed by DHS, the U.S. 
Department of State, U.S. Department of Justice, and the Office of the 
Director of National Intelligence.214 A revised screening process “could 
include holding more in-person interviews, searches of an expanded 
database of identity documents or longer application forms.”215 The 
March 6, 2017, Order further explained that expanded vetting and 
screening procedures would attempt to assess “malicious intent” and 
implement a “mechanism to assess whether [visa] applicants may 
commit, aid, or support any kind of violent, criminal, or terrorist acts.”216  
In contrast, the January 27, 2017, Order specifically stated that its 
purpose was to include an assessment of the ideological and 
constitutional posture of immigrants through extreme vetting: 
In order to protect Americans, the United States must ensure 
that those admitted to this country do not bear hostile attitudes 
toward it and its founding principles. The United States cannot, 
and should not, admit those who do not support the 
Constitution, or those who would place violent ideologies over 
American law.217  
The March 6, 2017, Order did not include this language, however, 
the screening and vetting requirements set forth in Section 5 of the Order 
was more expansive and ambiguous. For instance, instead of focusing on 
constitutional ideology, Section 5 of the Order cast a wide pre-crime net, 
stating that the screening and vetting standards would analyze, amongst 
other concerns, a “risk of causing harm.”218  
The March 6, 2017, Order maintained several important provisions 
that were articulated in the January 27, 2017 version. Both asserted that 
restricting travel from the identified countries was “detrimental to the 
interests of the United States” and suspended immigration from those 
countries for ninety days while visa protocols were scrutinized.219 Both 
lowered the refugee cap in 2017 to 50,000 refugees, down from 85,000 
refugee cap set by the Obama Administration for 2016.220 As in the 
original, the March 6, 2017, Order ensured that state and local 
 
 214. Id. at 13215. 
 215. Reuters, Here’s What Trump’s Order on Extreme Vetting Includes, 
BUSINESS INSIDER (Jan. 28, 2017, 12:19 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/heres-
what-trumps-order-on-extreme-vetting-includes-2017-1 [https://perma.cc/W74H-S24U]. 
 216. Exec. Order, Mar. 6, Travel Ban II at 13215. 
 217. Exec. Order, Jan. 27, Travel Ban I at 8977. 
 218. Exec. Order, Mar. 6, Travel Ban II at 13215. 
 219. Id. at 13213; see Exec. Order, Jan. 27, Travel Ban I at 82. 
 220. Exec. Order, Jan. 27, Travel Ban I at 8978; Exec. Order, Mar. 6, Travel Ban 
II at 13216.  
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jurisdictions enjoy an expanded role in the process of refugee 
resettlement.221 This is likely in response to multiple lawsuits attempting 
to overturn state bans on the resettlement of Syrian refugees in those 
states.222 
A full legal analysis of the Travel Ban cases extends beyond the 
scope of this Article. At the time of publication, the litigation remains 
ongoing and executive actions surrounding the Travel Ban and extreme 
vetting are dynamic; however, a cursory overview of recent 
developments is as follows. On September 24, 2017, the ninety-day entry 
suspension in Section 2(c) of the March 6, 2017, Order expired. In 
response, the President issued a Proclamation, pursuant to Section 2(e) of 
the March 6, 2017 Order. Consequently, on September 24, 2017, the 
travel restrictions and the vetting requirements were expanded in a third 
iteration of the Travel Ban, titled, “Enhancing Vetting Capabilities and 
Processes for Detecting Attempted Entry into the United States by 
Terrorists or Other Public-Safety Threats.”223 President Trump signed 
this new Proclamation (the “September 24, 2017, Proclamation”)224 
before oral arguments were scheduled for the U.S. Supreme Court in the 
consolidated Travel Ban cases of Trump v. Hawaii and Trump v. 
International Refugee Assistance Project.225  
Solicitor General Noel Francisco claimed that the executive action 
“was issued after the completion of a worldwide review conducted under 
Section 2(a) of the [March 6, 2017] Order to determine what additional 
information (if any) is needed from each foreign country to assess 
whether that country’s nationals who seek to enter the United States pose 
a security or safety threat.”226 Furthermore, Solicitor General Francisco 
characterized the September 24, 2017, Proclamation as “impos[ing] 
certain conditional restrictions on entry into the United States of 
nationals of a small number of countries”227 due to “the President’s 
findings regarding those countries’ information-sharing capabilities and 
practices and other serious terrorism-related risks the countries 
present.”228 The September 24, 2017, Proclamation was set to go into 
effect on October 18, 2018. On October 17, 2017, significant parts of the 
 
 221. Exec. Order, Jan. 27, Travel Ban I at 8980; Exec. Order, Mar. 6, Travel Ban 
II. 
 222. See, e.g., Exodus Refugee Immigration, Inc. v. Pence, 838 F.3d 902, 903–04 
(7th Cir. 2016). 
 223. Proclamation, Sept. 24, Travel Ban III. 
 224. Proclamation, Sept. 24, Travel Ban III. 
 225. 137 S. Ct. 2080 (2017). 
 226. Letter from U.S. Solicitor Noel General Francisco to the Clerk of the 
Supreme Court, dated September 24, 2017. 
 227. Id. 
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September 24, 2017, Proclamation were enjoined by the Districts of 
Hawaii and Maryland in Hawaii v. Trump229 and International Refugee 
Assistance Project v. Trump,230 respectively. 
The September 24, 2017, Proclamation differs from the prior 
Orders. The March 6, 2017, Order fully replaced the January 27, 2017, 
Order. The September 24, 2017, Proclamation, however, supplements the 
March 6, 2017, Order. Importantly, the September 24, 2017, 
Proclamation shifts the focus away from an Entry Ban or a Travel Ban 
and emphasizes more clearly the vetting and screening provisions set 
forth by the prior Orders. The Proclamation and other executive action 
now makes clear that extreme vetting must be understood as part of a 
web of biometric and biographic tracking technologies that DHS has 
termed “identity management.”231  
The March 6, 2017, Order left the extreme vetting provisions of the 
January 27, 2017, Order in place.232 The vetting requirements were 
expanded in several respects,233 and most fully articulated in Section 5, 
titled “Implementing Uniform Screening and Vetting Standards for All 
Immigration Programs.”234 Sections 1(a) through (h) of the September 
24, 2017, Proclamation expands extreme vetting even further. The 
September 24, 2017, Proclamation focuses its attention on “identity-
management and information-sharing capabilities, protocols, and 
practices” related to immigration screening and vetting.235  
 Additionally, the September 24, 2017, Proclamation instituted a 
number of changes to the requirements that had been previously imposed 
by the March 6, 2017, Order. Under the September 24, 2017, 
 
 229. Hawaii v. Trump, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 171242 (D. Haw., Oct. 17, 2017).  
 230. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump , 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 171879 
(D. Md., Oct. 17, 2017). 
 231. See Proclamation, Sept. 24, Travel Ban III; Exec. Order, Oct. 27, Enhanced 
Vetting. DHS offers this definition of identity management: 
Identity Management (IdM) deals with identifying and managing individuals 
within a government, state, local, public, or private sector network or 
enterprise. In addition, authentication and authorization to access resources 
such as facilities or, sensitive data within that system are managed by 
associating user rights, entitlements, and privileges with the established 
identity. 
Cyber Security Division Identity Management Program Video, U.S. DEP’T HOMELAND 
SEC., https://www.dhs.gov/science-and-technology/cyber-security-division-identity-
management-program-video [https://perma.cc/F9KK-XVRE]. 
 232. Exec. Order, Mar. 6, Travel Ban II §§ 1–2; see also id. § 5 (“Implementing 
Uniform Screening and Vetting Standards for All Immigration Programs”). 
 233. Compare id., with Exec. Order, Jan. 27, Travel Ban I § 4. 
 234. Exec. Order, Mar. 6, Travel Ban II § 5. 
 235. Id.; see also supra note 231 and accompanying text (discussing U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security definition of “identity management”).  
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Proclamation, for example, Sudan nationals are no longer restricted from 
entry.236 Immigrants who are nationals from seven nations are suspended 
from entering indefinitely: Iran, Libya, Somalia, Syria, Yemen, Chad, 
and North Korea.237 Of that group, only nationals from Chad and North 
Korea were not subject to March 6, 2017, Order.238 However, 
nonimmigrant entry of nationals from those seven countries is suspended 
in varying degrees.239 Nonimmigrant nationals from North Korea and 
Syria are suspended from entry.240 Nonimmigrant nationals from Iran can 
enter in general, but not on business (B-1), tourist (B-2), or 
business/tourist (B-1/B-2) visas.241  
Some nationals from Venezuela are subject to this same suspension: 
a number of officials, and their immediate family members, of 
Venezuelan agencies that work in screening and vetting procedures, such 
as the Ministry of the Popular Power for Interior, Justice and Peace; the 
Administrative Service of Identification, Migration and Immigration; the 
Scientific, Penal and Criminal Investigation Service Corps; the 
Bolivarian National Intelligence Service; and the Ministry of the Popular 
Power for Foreign Relations.242 Other nationals from Venezuela who 
have visas have to comply with additional measures to maintain their 
traveler information.243  
Nationals from Somalia are subject to “additional scrutiny” 
regarding issuance of visas and permission to enter “to determine if 
applicants are connected to terrorist organizations or otherwise pose a 
threat to the national security or public safety of the United States.”244 
The September 24, 2017, Proclamation defines “immigrant” as someone 
who enters subject to an immigrant visa who becomes a lawful 
permanent resident once in the United States.245 Furthermore, before it 
was enjoined, the Proclamation was to take effect on October 18, 2017, 
except for those who were already subject to Section 2(c) of the March 6, 
2017, Order—namely, nationals from Iran, Libya, Somalia, Syria, and 
Yemen—for whom the September 24, 2017, Proclamation had an 
immediate effect.246 
 
 236. See Proclamation, Sept. 24, Travel Ban III. 
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The January 27, 2017, and March 6, 2017, Orders mandated 
immediate completion of the “Biometric Entry-Exit Tracking System” by 
DHS,247 a system with the stated aim of tracking foreign visitors’ arrival 
and departure from United States airports, borders, and other ports of 
entry by screening biometric data through government databases.248 The 
Obama Administration had previously announced that it would aim to 
implement biometric exit checks at the largest airports in the nation 
by 2018.249 Some experts have explained that system risks limited 
efficacy unless it is extended to all land, air, and sea ports of entry,250 and 
unless it includes biometric data on all those residing in the United 
States, both citizens and noncitizens.251 “According to a 2014 report from 
the Bipartisan Policy Center the system would be expensive to 
implement and would ‘offer mixed value for enforcement objectives.’”252 
 Section 5 of the March 6, 2017, Order suggested pre-crime 
objectives, stating that the screening and vetting standards will analyze, 
for example, the “risk of causing harm.”253 The September 24, 2017, 
Proclamation expands the ambiguity of the objectives of the screening 
and vetting protocols. In section 1(a) of the September 24, 2017, 
Proclamation, it states that the purpose is “to protect its citizens from 
terrorist attacks and other public-safety threats. Screening and vetting 
protocols and procedures associated with visa adjudications and other 
immigration processes play a critical role in implementing that 
policy.”254 Repeatedly, the September 24, 2017, Proclamation refers to 
 
 247. Exec. Order, Mar. 6, Travel Ban II, at 13216; see also Exec. Order, Jan. 27, 
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“identity management” systems and protocols. Multiple additional 
challenges to the September 24, 2017, Proclamation have ensued, and a 
new Executive Order addressing enhanced vetting was announced on 
October 24, 2017.255 
C. Biometric ID Cybersurveillance and Algorithmic Screening Tools as 
Big Data Proxies for Race and Other Classifications Under the Travel 
Ban and Extreme Vetting Protocols 
On a practical programmatic level, identity management systems are 
coterminous with biometric identification systems.256 “Extreme vetting” 
or “enhanced vetting” will likely entail biometric database screening and 
other enhanced database screening protocols that rely upon biometric 
data as an identifying data anchor point257 or data backbone for multiple 
screening and vetting systems.258 Clarifying how biometric technology 
may be used for surveillance is therefore essential to understand the role 
of biometric cybersurveillance and algorithmic tools in extreme vetting 
programs, as well as their possible abuse as proxies in big data 
surveillance and screening. 
 
 255. At the time of publication, multiple complaints have been filed to challenge 
the Proclamation. See, e.g., Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 26–27, 
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Exec. Order, Oct. 27, Enhanced Vetting.  
 256. DHS Office of Biometric Identity Management, supra note 145; see also 
Hu, Biometric Cyberintelligence, supra note 1; Hu, Biometric ID, supra note 1. 
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Biometrics is “[t]he science of automatic identification or identity 
verification of individuals using physiological or behavioral 
characteristics.”259 Because such characteristics are unique to an 
individual, they are often considered a “gold standard” method of 
identity verification.260 Biometric identification and verification systems 
can involve “hard” or “soft” biometrics.261 The difference between hard 
and soft biometrics is “perceived reliability for automated identification 
matching technologies.”262 Hard biometrics are traditional biometric 
identifiers that serve “secure identification and personal verification 
solutions.”263 Examples of hard biometrics include fingerprints, facial 
recognition, iris scans, and DNA. Soft biometrics are “anatomical or 
behavioral characteristic[s] that provide[] some information about the 
identity of a person, but does not provide sufficient evidence to precisely 
determine the identity.”264 Examples of soft biometric identifiers include 
a digital analysis or automatic determination of age, height, weight, race 
or ethnicity, skin and hair color, scars, birthmarks, and tattoos.265 
Publicly available information, including information available 
through the Freedom of Information Act, demonstrates that DHS is using 
data technologies such as data fusion and algorithm-driven predictive 
analytics.266 Although at this point in time, determining how extreme 
vetting will be implemented is still speculative, publicly available 
information suggests that extreme vetting will involve big data 
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technologies, analytics, database screening, monitoring social media, and 
other cybersurveillance techniques.267  
DHS has expanded its identity management initiatives, such as 
biometric ID credentials and background checks, which includes mass 
biometric data collection and analysis.268 Identity management as a 
policy rationale is intended to facilitate governance decisions by 
tethering risk to rights and privileges.269 Essentially, analytic 
technologies can permit risk assessments based on data, which are then 
linked to the individual’s digital and physical identity through 
biometrics. This information then can be used to make determinations for 
governance and security purposes.270 This effort to seize upon the body 
via biometrics—and make it the locus for an ostensibly neutral and 
objective analysis—has a history that should not be forgotten, no matter 
how different biometric cybersurveillance is from its past variants. 
III. UTILIZING CRITICAL THEORY TO INTERROGATE THE 
DISCRIMINATORY IMPACT OF CRIMMIGRATION-COUNTERTERRORISM 
Part I explored the historical genesis of “extreme vetting”: attempts 
to enforce border security and interior enforcement of unwanted 
migration through an increasing emphasis on biometric identification and 
screening protocols. It described how, following the terrorist attacks of 
September 11th, 2001, multiple advances in database screening and 
algorithmic-driven screening now depend upon biometric data as a data 
backbone for contemporary security vetting systems.  
Part II discussed how the Muslim Ban morphed into a Travel Ban 
before more firmly settling into an extreme vetting or enhanced vetting 
policy mandate. Given the legal hurdles the Travel Ban has faced thus 
far, it will likely morph again to target new groups further removed from 
the traditional protected categories recognized under constitutional law, 
such as race, national origin, ethnicity, gender, and religion. In addition, 
as stated above, the federal courts have not yet had an opportunity to 
assess the legal implications of extreme vetting.271 In this way, the long-
term constitutional impact of the Travel Ban, namely, the impact of the 
extreme vetting protocols and its progeny, is yet to be determined. Thus, 
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any federal court decision, to the extent that it focuses only on the Travel 
Ban and excludes the vetting and screening protocols that may flow from 
it, may be limited in its usefulness in an analysis of the discriminatory 
reach of the Executive Orders and Proclamation.272 
A. Parallels Between Travel Ban and Past Discrimination Under Rule of 
Law: Chinese Exclusion Act and WWII Japanese-American Internment 
Facially neutral terms and categories must be analyzed in the 
context of their history and genealogy. The legal precedent that underlies 
the Travel Ban has a genealogy that descends from the Chinese 
Exclusion Act cases and Japanese internment cases of World War II. The 
Chinese Exclusion Act cases are particularly instructive in demonstrating 
phobias of foreign culture that the Court found threatened what the Court 
appeared to suggest were ineffable “American” qualities of our society.  
Both before and after President Trump issued the Executive Orders 
intended to suspend travel from nationals of designated Muslim-majority 
countries, commentators drew comparisons between the Travel Ban and 
the Chinese Exclusion Act.273 Executive Orders 13,769 and 13,780 have 
also drawn comparisons to the Japanese Internment Order, Executive 
Order 9,066,274 particularly because as a candidate, Trump and other 
advisors had cited President Roosevelt’s actions and Korematsu v. 
United States275 as justification for both the Muslim Ban and a Muslim 
database registry.276 Then-candidate Trump explained that, “What I’m 
doing is no different than FDR,” to ABC News during the campaign.277  
 
 272. Id. See also Noferi & Koulish, supra note 5. 
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A former spokesman for the Great America Political Action 
Committee, Carl Higbie, explained during an interview that a Muslim 
database registry would be legal and “hold constitutional muster” based 
on Korematsu.278 Like both the Chinese Exclusion Act, and Executive 
Order 9,066 and the orders related to WWII Japanese-American 
Internment, the Travel Ban Executive Orders were based on rationales 
relating to national security.279 The Chinese Exclusion Acts relied on 
congressional conclusions that Chinese laborers posed a threat to 
communities.280 Executive Order 9,066 justified its decision to detain 
individuals based on “every possible protection against espionage and 
against sabotage to national-defense material, national-defense premises, 
and national defense utilities,”281 flowing from the President’s Executive 
Branch authority as Commander in Chief.282 Executive Orders 13,769 
and 13,780 were issued to “protect its citizens from terrorist attacks, 
including those committed by foreign nationals. . . . [and] to improve the 
screening and vetting protocols and procedures associated with the visa-
issuance process and the USRAP.”283 
The Court upheld the Chinese Exclusion Acts and the Japanese-
American Internment Order, Executive Order 9,066, on national security 
grounds.284 The Court’s decision to vacate the case and remand it with 
instructions to dismiss as moot means that the constitutionality of the 
Travel Ban has yet to be determined; however, the Courts of Appeals 
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justifications suggested by the government to support the ban.285 National 
security aims, as one of the governmental interests claimed to be among 
the most important,286 typically enjoy generous deference by the judicial 
branch. That reviewing courts have been skeptical despite a tradition of 
national security deference to the executive is likely attributable to the 
fraught precedent that appears to support such deference.287  
Experts explain that the debates, which included racial arguments, 
leading to the passage of the Chinese Exclusion Act stemmed from an 
“assumption that the Chinese were a distinct race with a biologically 
determined nature that was reflected in moral behavior, cultural 
preferences, and physiological traits.”288 The parallels with contemporary 
rhetoric about the danger posed by Muslims and the inevitable clash with 
Western values are obvious. None of this is to deny the threat of 
terrorism, but at the same time distinguishing that threat to the overblown 
rhetoric it has engendered in the public sphere is essential. 
Pulitzer Prize-winning columnist, Eugene Robinson of the 
Washington Post, warns that the Muslim Ban and extreme vetting can 
lead to what he refers to as a “special version of Jim Crow” for 
Muslims.289 Then-Attorney General Sally Yates, in fact, explained in 
media reports that her refusal to defend the January 27, 2017, Order 
stemmed in part because she “thought back to Jim Crow laws.”290 All 
U.S. citizens could logically be subjected to extreme vetting protocols, as 
any citizen or noncitizen may pose a terroristic threat risk.291 In fact, 
significantly, the original announcement of Trump’s Muslim Ban 
indicated that the proposal was inclusive of U.S. citizens. In February 
2016, retired General Lieutenant Michael Flynn, Trump’s former 
campaign adviser on national security and former White House National 
Security Adviser, stated on Twitter: “Fear of Muslims is 
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RATIONAL.”292 During a speech in August 2016, Flynn characterized 
Islamism as a “‘vicious cancer inside the body of 1.7 billion people’ that 
has to be ‘excised[.]’”293 Although experts argue that a small minority of 
Muslims have adopted radicalized Islamist views,294 according to 
Robinson, “[i]n Trump’s eyes, however, all Muslims are suspect.”295 
The original statement released by then-candidate Trump on the 
Muslim Ban characterized “Shariah [sic]” as “authoriz[ing] such 
atrocities as murder against non-believers who won’t convert, 
beheadings and more unthinkable acts that pose great harm to 
Americans, especially women.”296 The rhetoric was inflammatory, 
magnifying the threat posed by international terrorism to encompass an 
entire religion apparently inherently predisposed to attack Western 
values. Similar to the rhetoric that led to the Chinese Exclusion Act and 
the Japanese Internment, the rhetoric of the Muslim Ban separated 
“them”—characterized as persons seeking to infiltrate and then terrorize 
our society—from “us,” translating a real national security concern into 
an authority to target uncomfortable cultural otherness.297  
Consequently, the federal courts have been invited in the litigation 
surrounding the Travel Ban to assess the government’s arguments that 
the ban is facially neutral and non-discriminatory. As with the claims 
raised in defense of the Chinese Exclusion Act and Japanese Internment, 
the facially-neutral crimmigration-counterterrorism policy rationales 
advanced by the administration in support of the Travel Ban are similar 
to the national security policy rationales of the past.  
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B. Critical Theory as a Method to Unmask Cyber-Registration Under 
Crimmigration-Counterterrorism Policy 
Both the Chinese Exclusion Act and Japanese Internment were 
dressed in a national security rationale that the Court embraced.298 With 
the perspective of history, experts note that racism and xenophobia, 
rather than national security, was the driving force.299 We do not have the 
benefit of history in the present context, even if there is significant 
evidence that current xenophobic trends are seizing upon and gaining 
expression through policies attempting to address the real security threat 
posed by terrorism.300 Thus, prevention of invidious discrimination 
depends heavily on the robustness of any judicial review available in due 
process and other challenges to government efforts to ban, restrict, or 
target surveillance on various social groups.301  
Even biometrics, which in some sense purport to stand outside 
history, rooted in the signs of the body, have a history and have been a 
means for constructing and enforcing racial and cultural divisions. 
Databases and their sorting algorithms, in short, cannot be taken on their 
own terms because their effects on society will be real and so there must 
be vigilance to ensure they are not also pernicious. 
In this context, judicial challenge currently provides an unlikely 
avenue to protect rights in large part because there is very little 
understanding of how biometric datafication of the body and biometric 
surveillance affect rights. This is a topic of interest to surveillance study 
scholars and sociologists and should be one of equal interest to legal 
scholars who should join in the project of developing what Simone 
Browne aptly characterizes as “critical biometric consciousness.”302 By 
this, she means a Critical Theory project to educate ourselves and others 
on how biometrics work and how they rely upon, and can reinforce, 
social racialization and potentially discrimination.  
To advance this conversation, legal scholars can engage a wide 
range of critical tools303—including Critical Theory, Critical Race 
Theory, Surveillance Studies, Critical Terrorism Studies, and other 
critical theoretical approaches—to better understand the discriminatory 
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aspects of modern vetting and screening systems promulgated by 
crimmigration-counterterrorism policies that are heavily cyber- and big 
data-reliant. The formulation of an informed and protective social policy 
in relation to biometric surveillance and the use of biometric data is a 
crucial first step to ensuring individual rights such as due process, equal 
protection, and First Amendment rights—among the claims raised in the 
Travel Ban litigation—are cognizable in rapidly evolving cyber policy 
contexts. 
The Travel Ban, while the most prominent part of the Executive 
Orders, is not the only part. In the long run, it is likely to be 
overshadowed by the long-term consequences of “extreme vetting” and 
biometric cybersurveillance of foreigners, and potentially citizens, 
deemed to present enough of a risk to warrant surveillance. An outright 
legal challenge to these aspects of the Executive Order faces difficulties 
in that their impact on individuals will neither be as immediate and 
dramatic as banning entrance or return to the country, and indeed with 
regard to surveillance, may not be felt at all, at least immediately. 
Assessing and even understanding such impacts requires legal scholars to 
join the ongoing conversation about biometrics and their use in the 
administrative state.304  
Scholars like Browne note that biometrics have a veneer of 
scientific objectivity and technologic infallibility.305 But in the end they 
involve classifying traits of the body such that persons may be identified 
as authentically who they say they are. Surveillance technology designed 
to identify facial and other features means placing such features within 
classificatory frameworks and typologies and that in turn requires 
mobilizing racial, ethnic, and gendered categories.306 Indeed Browne 
reviewed research on biometrics and finds within that discourse a “racial 
nomenclature” that in other contexts would be regarded as “seemingly 
archaic” but is alive and well in this cutting edge science.307 In short, 
biometrics relies upon, rather than transcends, gendering and racializing 
categories. 
This in itself, of course, does not make biometrics inherently 
discriminatory but a biometric critical consciousness is one that, at a 
minimum, seeks to understand how racial and other categories are 
mobilized by biometric systems to make the body “readable” and 
identifiable. Browne is alert to norms implicit in the very technology. 
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Certain bodies—elderly and Asian/Pacific Islander, for instance—have 
fingerprints that are difficult or impossible to measure, a trait also in 
common with laborers in jobs requiring frequent use of caustic 
chemicals.308  
If biometric researchers are discovering gendered, racial, and even 
social class distinctions in the kind of data the body offers up, how much 
more so will be the case when such distinctions are actively sought? 
Under crimmigration-counterterrorism policies, such amassed data is 
being analyzed for purposes of assessing a terror risk. Amassing a 
Muslim registry, thus, could create a database and then yield data 
patterns that perhaps will be determined to characterize typical “Muslim” 
classifications. Other categories could be registered to assist national 
security or other policy objectives. Those isolated as fitting those 
patterns, but who may not necessarily self-identify with the cyber-
registry classification, can be targeted for surveillance, detention, and 
other consequences.309 
A critical biometric consciousness means we make an effort to 
understand how biometrics work and how they employ such categories, 
and how, in more subtle ways than imposing outright bans, they create, 
or create the potential for, traditional forms of discrimination imposed in 
perhaps untraditional ways. And, above all, it means remembering that 
humans create the classifications biometrics use; humans create the 
algorithms which operate biometric databases, and humans make the 
decisions how to act upon the results of biometric matching efforts and 
biometric database analyses. As Browne notes, the trigger for acting on 
suspicious data may differ depending on race and the type of actions 
may, in turn, differ depending on race and other variables.310  
Browne calls for approaching data rights through Critical Theory.311 
And moreover, a critical biometric consciousness should explore how we 
protect due process in the face of decisions to grant or deny rights and 
benefits on the basis of purportedly “objective” and “infallible” 
biometric matching and analysis.  
Scholars in other fields are already turning a critical lens upon this 
technology. Browne’s call for a critical biometric consciousness is 
invoking the tradition of Critical Theory, a tradition which already holds 
a prominent influence in legal scholarship, as seen most prominently in 
Critical Race Theory. This kind of scholarship provides a necessary 
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starting point for an analysis of biometric identification under 
crimmigration-counterterrorism policy, especially since, as Browne 
points out, racial categories are likely to be prominent in the project of 
turning the body into nodes of capturable, classifiable, and then 
analyzable data.312 
C. Collateral Discrimination Under Crimmigration-Counterterrorism 
Policy 
In the Fourth Circuit’s en banc decision in International Refugee 
Assistant Project, Judge Wynn concluded his concurrence by noting that 
President Trump “seemed to suggest during the campaign” that 
statistically, Muslims are more likely to engage in terrorism, which 
“giv[es] rise to a factual inference” that admission would be harmful to 
the United States.313 And yet, regardless of the accuracy of such an 
inference, it is “impermissible as a matter of constitutional law” to place 
burdens on individuals on the basis of their membership in a protected 
class because they lack any moral responsibility for whatever traits one 
seeks to attribute to the overall class.314 Doing so cuts against “core 
democratic principles” and is “destabilizing to our Republic.”315 As this 
administration and future administrations promulgate big data vetting 
and cyber-registration, the statistical inference of big data methods of 
terroristic screening will likely increase the discrimination that may 
attach to correlative threat risk assessments or predictive assessments.316 
 Judge Wynn’s concurrence, therefore, may prove to be even more 
valuable than the Fourth Circuit’s majority opinion in this end. Judge 
Wynn broadens an understanding of the crimmigration-counterterrorism 
rationales presented by the Administration as a form of national security 
pretext for what he views as its underlying invidious discriminatory 
impetus. Addressing the national security justifications on their own 
terms, he finds them both constitutionally problematic and irrational 
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because they do not account for the individual’s intent.317 Instead, they 
impute a risk to entire class of individuals who are then targeted by the 
Travel Ban. He makes clear that national security risks cannot be 
determined by race, religion, or country of national origin.318 Judge 
Wynn presses this position to its full extent, urging that it is both illogical 
and contrary to core democratic values, and asserting that in stigmatizing 
these classes with regard to foreigner status, damage is inevitably done to 
U.S. citizens similarly belonging to these classes.319 This last point is 
particularly significant, since the stigmatic association with groups and 
classes deemed to post terroristic threat risks is not a legal harm that is 
easily recognized. Yet, the possibility exists that discrimination against 
foreigners on the basis of race, nationality, or religion will redound to 
U.S. citizens who belong to those same classes. 
When and if the Court will have an opportunity to resolve the 
Travel Ban litigation remains unclear at the time of publication. 
Regardless of the final disposition of the case, it seems unlikely at this 
point that the treatment of the Travel Ban will embrace Judge Wynn’s 
recognition of a general stigmatic harm to U.S. citizens who fall within 
classes targeted by a ban on foreigners. In part that is because it seems 
unlikely, at the merits, that the Court will address the reasoning of a 
concurrence.320 Prior to dismissing the case as moot, the Court had 
narrowed the lower court’s injunction, finding that a ban on entry of 
foreign nationals with insufficient ties to the United States “does not 
burden any American party by reason of that party’s relationship with the 
foreign national.”321 
With a focus back on the issue of biometric cybersurveillance, 
Judge Wynn’s concurrence is of keen interest because it is not rooted in 
immigration law. Rather, Judge Wynn relies on free-floating statutory 
interpretation canons that apply to all statutes, not just the INA 
(Immigration and Nationality Act), and require courts to interpret statutes 
in ways to avoid constitutional issues. In his reasoning, he acknowledges 
the stigmatizing effect of discrimination against protected classes, even 
where an individual is not the direct target of such discrimination. It is 
likely that cybersurveillance will use such protected classifications in 
determining surveillance priorities and in creating algorithms for threat 
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assessments.322 And in this context, the stigmatizing effects will be real. 
Race, nationality, and religion may subject an individual to various forms 
of cybersurveillance profiling that one might otherwise escape but for 
one’s association with those classes.  
This analytical approach to the discriminatory impact of the Travel 
Ban, if and when combined with Critical Theory tools, can assist in the 
project of unmasking the emerging problem of cyber-registration. Cyber-
registration can and should be likened to the paper-based registration 
systems structured to track and monitor Chinese immigrants and 
Chinese-Americans under the Chinese Exclusion Act323 and the paper-
based registration of those of Japanese ancestry and Japanese-Americans 
under the Japanese Internment program.324 Without proper legal and 
theoretical tools, the risk is a failure to recognize how crimmigration-
counterterrorism cybersurveillance technologies may allow for cyber-
registration structures that the government may argue are facially neutral 
and justified by compelling national security objectives. 
Thus, however unlikely to be embraced by the Court in the future, 
Judge Wynn’s concurrence articulates a valuable legal principle that has 
the potential of establish limits on cybersurveillance in general, as well 
as cyber-registries and digital watchlisting systems, such as terrorist 
watchlists and database screening systems that purportedly screen for 
terrorism, such as the No Fly List, extreme vetting, and its progeny. 
More pragmatically speaking, it may be worth exploring how his judicial 
reasoning can be statutorily codified as legal limits on government 
action. The lesson to be drawn from this litigation more broadly is that 
the INA’s limitations on executive action may be a good model for 
legislation seeking to restrain executive authority in the context of 
crimmigration-counterrorism cybersurveillance such as extreme vetting 
protocols that may eventually extend to screening all citizens and 
noncitizens for national security purposes. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article discussed the manner in which immigration-related 
identification and vetting systems can facilitate invidious discrimination. 
The types of analyses that can occur with modern biometric 
identification systems and algorithmic vetting systems can move beyond 
the level of overt and invidious discrimination, the sort that forms the 
basis of a legally cognizable claim under the present legal frameworks 
that guard against discrimination. Race, national origin, or religion are 
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arguably the legally problematic basis for requiring the surrender of 
biometric information in the current Proclamation and Executive Order; 
but, once that information is in a database, it consists of individualizing 
data designed for recognition. Such data is then analyzed to enable risk 
determinations, which means risk will have generalizing characteristics. 
The question is then two-fold. One question is whether those 
generalizing characteristics will act to reinforce prejudicial dispositions 
against vulnerable classes of people. The second question is whether they 
will serve to obscure any disproportionate impacts of administrative 
decisionmaking on such protected classes. 
The litigation surrounding the implementation of the Chinese 
Exclusion Act and its progeny, and Korematsu and other WWII 
Japanese-American Internment cases, teach that in retrospect, national 
security justifications can be driven by or give expression to broader 
cultural phobias and prejudices that current events help bring to a boiling 
point. Interfering with the Executive’s efforts to address national security 
is of course a perilous venture. However, history teaches that 
discrimination that seems necessary and protective today will often, in 
hindsight, seem overbroad, unnecessary, and motivated on some level by 
prejudicial social currents. Fully digesting the implications of this 
unfolding new immigration policy under crimmigration-counterterrorism 
rationales requires placing it in the proper historical context. 
